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While  many  philosophers  have  found  Hegel's  critique  of  Kantian  ethics  to  be  interesting  in 
certain  respects,  overall  most  tend  to   nd  it  rather  shallow  and  to  think  that  Hegel  either 
misunderstands  Kant’s  thought  or  has  a  rather  crude  understanding  of  it.   For  example,  in 
examining  the  last  two  sections  of  Chapter  V  of  the  Phenomenology—  "Reason  as  Lawgiver"  and 
"Reason  as  Testing  Laws"  (where  we  get  an  extended  critique  of  the  categorical 
imperative)—Lauer   nds  Hegel's  treatment  to  be  truncated  and  inadequate.     The  only  trouble, 
1
1 Notes 
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though,  is  that  like  most  other  readers  of  the  Phenomenology,   Lauer  does  not  recognize  that 
Hegel  had  been  examining  and  criticizing  Kantian  ethics  throughout  a  much  greater  part 
of—indeed,  more  than  half  of—Chapter  V.   Once  we  do  understand  this,  I  think  we  must 
concede  that  Hegel's  treatment  is  hardly  truncated  and  that  it  cannot  be  described  as  shallow  or 
inadequate.   I  will  try  to  show  that  Hegel  demonstrates  a  rather  sophisticated  understanding  of, 
and  gives  a  serious  and  thorough  critique  of,  Kantian  practical  reason. 
A  good  part  of  the  problem  here  is  due  to  Hegel's  own  obscurity.   The  Phenomenology   is 
 lled  with  veiled  allusions  to  other  texts.   Lauer  thinks  we  should  be  slow  in  concluding  just 
what  texts  Hegel  is  actually  referring  to.   He  suggests  that  Hegel  may  not  have  been  sure  himself 
or  that  he  wanted  to  refer  to  an  amalgam  of  positions.     This  point  is  well  taken.   Hegel's 
2
allusions  are  not  speci c  and  precise.   They  are  general,  open,  even  symbolic—as  if  they  were 
trying  to  refer  to  as  much  as  possible.   Thus,  I  very  de nitely  do  not  want  to  imply  that  Hegel 
was  signi cantly  in uenced  by  and  alludes  to  Kant  and  not  other  philosophers.    Nor  do  I  want 
to  suggest  that  by  establishing  a  connection  to  Kant  we  will  be  able  to  explain  everything   that  is 
going  on  in  Hegel's  text.   Nevertheless,  I  do  think  that  to  understand  Hegel  we  simply  must  begin 
   Q.  Lauer,  S.J.,  A  Reading  of  Hegel's  Phenomenology  of  Spirit   (New  York:   Fordham 
University  Press,  1976),  172. 
2     Lauer,  42.   See  also,  R.B.  Pippin,  Hegel's  Idealism:   The  Satisfactions  of 
Self-Consciousness   (Cambridge:   Cambridge  University  Press,  1989),  118.   Also,  M.S.  Gram, 
“Moral  and  Literary  Ideals  in  Hegel’s  Critique  of  ‘The  Moral  View  of  the  World,’”  CLIO,   7  (1978), 
376. 
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to  understand  who  and  what  he  is  alluding  to.   I  want  to  try  to  show  that  among  all  the  other 
things  that  Hegel  is  doing  in  Chapter  V  he  is  criticizing  Kant's  ethics  and  that  only  when  we  see 
this  will  Hegel's  thought  start  to  come  into  focus,  become  clear  and  philosophically  interesting, 
and  provide  us  with  a  serious  critique  of  Kantian  ethical  theory. 
 
I   
Hegel  wants  to  claim  that  Kant’s  account  of  morality  is  inadequate  and  that  to  give  an  adequate 
account  we  must  move  to  Sittlichkeit.    In  the  section  entitled  "The  Actualization  of  Rational 
Self-Consciousness  Through  Its  Own  Activity,"  Hegel  begins  to  explain  his  concept  of 
Sittlichkeit.    Reason,  Hegel  claims,  is  actualized  only  in  a  free  nation.     Only  there  can  we   nd 
3
reason  objectively  realized  in  the  customs,  traditions,  practices,  laws,  and  institutions  of  a  people. 
The  citizens  pursue  their  purposes,  objectify  themselves  in  their  institutions,  and  see  themselves 
in  their  world.   They  create  a  common  public  life  which  is  the  outcome  of  the  activity  of  the 
individual  citizens,  yet  is  objective  and  substantial—it  is  a  force  that  develops,  sustains,  and 
morally  empowers  its  citizens.    
4
This  common  public  life   rst  appears  in  history  in  the  Greek  polis.    The  polis   is  the 
construction  of  its  citizens.   It  exists  through  their  work,  recognition,  and  sacri ce.   It  establishes 
a  common  life  that  is  objectively  rooted  in  social  and  public  institutions;  public  values,  traditions, 
3    Phenomenology  of  Spirit   (hereafter  PhS  ),  trans.  A.V.  Miller  (Oxford:   Clarendon  Press, 
1977),  214  and,  for  the  German,  Gesammelte  Werke   (hereafter  GW  ),   ed.  Rheinisch-Westfälischen 
Akademie  der  Wissenschaften  (Hamburg:   Felix  Meiner,  1968   .),  IX,  195. 
4    PhS,   211-13  and  GW,   IX,  193-94. 
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and  laws;  a  whole  philosophy,  religion,  and  art.   Citizens  are  willing  to  serve  and  to  sacri ce  for 
this  objective  reality,  a  reality  which  then  motivates  them,  becomes  their  mission  and  purpose, 
and  forms  and  empowers  them  as  a  people.   Moreover,  this  objective  sociocultural  world  is  not 
other,  alien,  or  heteronomous.   The  citizens  are  not  unfree.   They  see  themselves  in  a  world  they 
have  constructed;  they   nd  this  world  to  be  their  own;  and  they  are  at  one  with  it.   They   nd 
reason  in  their  world  and  are  free.  
Sittlichkeit   is  di erent  from  Moralität.   Moralität   begins  with  Socrates  and  reaches  its  high 
point  in  Kant.   Moralität   is  individual,  rational,  and  re ective  morality.   It  is  based  upon 
individual  autonomy  and  personal  conviction.   One  must  rationally  decide  what  is  moral  and  do 
it  because   it  is  moral—because  our  rationality  tells  us  that  it  is  the  right  thing  to  do.   This 
rational  and  re ective  component  is  relatively  absent  in  traditional  Sittlichkeit,   which  is  best 
represented,  for  Hegel,  in  the  Greek  polis   before  the  rise  of  Socratic  Moralität.   Sittlichkeit   is 
ethical  behavior  grounded  in  custom  and  tradition  and  developed  through  habit  and  imitation  in 
accordance  with  the  laws  and  practices  of  the  community.   Personal  re ection  and  analysis  have 
little  to  do  with  traditional  Sittlichkeit.   Sittlichkeit   is  ethical  life  built  into  one's  character, 
attitudes,  and  feelings.  
Furthermore,  Moralität   involves  an  ought.   It  is  morality  that  ought  to  be  realized.   This 
ought  is  also  absent  from  Sittlichkeit.    For  it,  morality  is  not  something  we  merely  ought   to 
realize  or  ought   to  be.   Morality  exists—it  is.    It  is  already  embedded  in  our  customs,  traditions, 
practices,  character,  attitudes,  and  feelings.   The  objective  ethical  order  already  exists  in,  is 
continuously  practiced  by,  is  actualized  in,  the  citizen. 
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The  only  sort  of  morality  that  Hegel  discusses  and  critiques  in  the  remainder  of  Chapter  V  is 
Moralität  —individual,  rational,  re ective  morality  with  individual  subjectivity  as  the  source  of 
moral  determination.   In  Chapter  VI,  culture  will  involve  Sittlichkeit—  ethical  life,  morality  built 
upon  custom,  tradition,  and  habit—the  morality  of  a  people  with  moral  content  given  in  their 
traditions,  institutions,  and  practices,  not  the  abstract  and  formal  Moralität   of  Kant. 
In  one  sense  Sittlichkeit   is  superior  to  Moralität.    It  has  a  rich  content—it  is  objective, 
public,  and  lived.   Whereas  Moralität   is  formal  and  abstract.   But  in  another  sense  traditional 
Sittlichkeit   is  inferior  to  Moralität.    Traditional  Sittlichkeit's   laws  are  immediate;  they  are  given 
as  absolutes  by  tradition,  the  gods,  custom.   In  contrast  to  Moralität,   the  role  of  subjectivity  and 
re ection  is  minimal  and  individual  freedom  is  undeveloped. 
What  Hegel  wants  for  the  modern  world  is  neither  traditional  Sittlichkeit   nor  modern 
Moralität.    He  wants  a  synthesis  of  Sittlichkeit   and  Moralität ,   which  though  at  times  confusing 
he  also  calls  Sittlichkeit.    This  higher  Sittlichkeit ,   which  Hegel  lays  out  in  detail  only  in  the 
Philosophy  of  Right,   combines  the  rational  and  re ective  side  of  Moralität   with  the 
transcendence  of  the  ought  characteristic  of  Sittlichkeit.    It  is  rational  re ective  morality  that 
actually  exists  as  concretely  embedded  in  the  customs,  traditions,  laws,  character,  practices,  and 
feelings  of  a  people.    
5
I  hope  to  show  that  Hegel's  entire  treatment  of  practical  reason  in  Chapter  V  of  the 
Phenomenology   is  intended  as  a  critique  of  Kantian  Moralität.    To  my  knowledge  this  has  not 
been  recognized  by  other  commentators.   The  aim  of  this  critique  is  to  drive  us  toward 
Sittlichkeit.    Let  me  try  to  make  the  case. 
5    PhS,   216  and  GW,   IX,  197. 
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II   
The   rst  consciousness  we  meet,  in  the  section  entitled  "Pleasure  and  Necessity,"  is  a  hedonistic 
consciousness.   It  pursues  pleasure.   "It  plunges  …  into  life  and  indulges  to  the  full.…  It  does  not 
so  much  make  its  own  happiness  as  straightway  take  it  and  enjoy  it.…  It  takes  hold  of  life  much 
as  a  ripe  fruit  is  plucked,  which  readily  o ers  itself  to  the  hand  that  takes  it."     What,  one  might 
6
ask,  has  this  to  do  with  Kantian  ethics?   Hegel  will  not  accept  the  Kantian  distinction  between 
phenomena  and  noumena  nor  the  existence  of  an  unknown  thing-in-itself.     It  follows  from  this, 
7
then,  that  we  are  not  going  to  be  easily  able  to  maintain  a  neat  Kantian  distinction  between  a  pure 
autonomous  reason,  on  the  one  hand,  and,  on  the  other,  pathological  inclinations,  interests,  or 
desires.   Hegel  starts  with  pleasure  because  he  is  not  about  to  let  Kant  banish  it  from  the  pure 
realm  of  reason  and  morality  into  some  pathological  and  heteronomous  outside.    
8
It  cannot  be  denied  that  Kant  at  times  does  present  a  rather  crude  picture  of  duty  and 
inclination  as  if  they  were  necessarily  opposed  and  such  that  moral  action  must  be  done,  as  he 
6    PhS,   218  and  GW,   IX,  199. 
7    The  Logic  of  Hegel   (hereafter  L  ),  trans.  W.  Wallace  (Oxford:   Oxford  University  Press, 
1968),  91-92  and,  for  the  German,  Sämtliche  Werke   (hereafter  SW  ),  ed.  H.  Glockner  (Stuttgart: 
Frommann,  1927   .),  VIII,  133.   PhS,   103  and  GW,   IX,  102. 
8    Foundations  of  the  Metaphysics  of  Morals   (hereafter  F   ),  trans.  L.W.  Beck  (Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill,  1959),   59-60  and,  for  the  German,  Kant's  gesammelte  Schriften   (hereafter  KGS  ), 
ed.  Königlich  Preussischen  Akademie  der  Wissenschaften  (Berlin:   Georg  Reimer,  1910   .),  IV, 
440-41. 
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says  in  the  Foundations,  "only  from  duty  and  without  any  inclination  …  "     But  it  is  not  only 
9
such  views  that  Hegel  is  attacking.   Hegel  is  well  aware  that  Kant’s  considered  view  is  not  that 
duty  and  inclination  are  mutually  exclusive  and  need  be  opposed.   He  is  quite  well  aware  that  for 
Kant  the  perfect  agreement  of  duty  and  inclination  is  an  “ideal  of  holiness  …  which  we  should 
strive  to  approach  …  in  an  uninterrupted  in nite  progress”  and  that  such  holiness  is  even  “the 
supreme  condition  of  the  highest  good.”     Indeed,  Hegel  will  discuss  this  very  ideal  at  length  not 
10
only  in  “The  Moral  View  of  the  World”  at  the  end  of  Chapter  VI,  but  as  I  shall  argue  shortly  also 
in  the  section  that  immediately  follows  ”Pleasure  and  Necessity,”  namely,  in  “The  Law  of  the 
Heart.”   At  any  rate,  Hegel  does  not   nd  acceptable  even  Kant’s  considered  view.   Kant’s 
considered  view  is  that  a  moral  act  need  not  be  free  of  inclination—perhaps  it  is  even  the  case 
that  it  can  never  be—but  still  it  must  not  be  determined  by  inclination.   Even  when  duty  and 
inclination  accord,  the  act  must  be  done  from  duty,  not  from  inclination.     In  Hegel’s  view,  Kant 
11
9    F,   14,  also  46  and  KGS,   IV,  398,  428. 
10    Critique  of  Practical  Reason   (hereafter  CPrR  ),  trans.  L.W.  Beck  (Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill,  1956),  86,  126  and  KGS,   V,  83-84,  122.   
11     CPrR,   86  and  KGS,   V,  83-84.   Metaphysical  Principles  of  Virtue:   Part  II  of  the 
Metaphysics  of  Morals   (hereafter  MPV  ),  trans.  J.  Ellington  (Indianapolis:   Bobbs-Merrill,  1964),  12 
and  KGS,   VI,  213-14.   Also,  see  H.E.  Allison,  Kant’s  Theory  of  Freedom   (Cambridge:   Cambridge 
University  Press,  1990),  39-40,  97,  102,  110-11.   Also,  A.W.  Wood,  Hegel’s  Ethical  Thought 
(Cambridge:   Cambridge  University  Press,  1990),  146-48.   K.R.  Westphal,  “Hegel’s  Critique  of 
Kant’s  Moral  View  of  the  World,”  Philosophical  Topics,   19  (1991),  150.   B.  Herman,  The  Practice 
of  Moral  Judgment   (Cambridge,  MA:   Harvard  University  Press,  1993),  12. 
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does  not  give  enough  place  to  inclination.   A  general  theme  of  the  whole  remainder  of  Chapter  V, 
I  shall  argue,  is  that  inclination,  interest,  love,  or  desire  are  far  more  able  to  produce  morality,  and 
that  Kantian  practical  reason  is  far  less  able  to  produce  morality,  than  Kant  thinks  is  the  case.   
Thus,  it  seems  to  me  that  Lauer  radically  misunderstands  “Pleasure  and  Necessity”  in  taking 
it  to  be  a  traditional  attack  on  pleasure  as  self-defeating.     It  is  not  that  at  all,  but  the  very 
12
opposite—a  defense.   Hegel  alludes  to  the  Faust  story  and  claims  that  the  pleasure-seeking  of  this 
consciousness  does  not  want  to  destroy  the  other,  but  only  its  otherness.     In  other  words,  Hegel 
13
is  talking  about  love.   In  the  Philosophy  of  Right,   Hegel  says,  
 
Love  means  in  general  terms  the  consciousness  of  my  unity  with  another,  so  that  I  am  not 
in  sel sh  isolation  but  win  my  self-consciousness  only  as  the  renunciation  of  my 
independence  and  through  knowing  myself  as  the  unity  of  myself  with  another  and  of  the 
other  with  me.…  The   rst  moment  in  love  is  that  I  do  not  wish  to  be  a  self-subsistent  and 
independent  person  and  that,  if  I  were,  then  I  would  feel  defective  and  incomplete.   The 
second  moment  is  that  I   nd  myself  in  another  person,  that  I  count  for  something  in  the 
other,  while  the  other  in  turn  comes  to  count  for  something  in  me.…  love  is  unity  of  an 
ethical  type.    
14
 
12    Lauer,  157. 
13    PhS,   218  and  GW,   IX,  199. 
14    Hegel's  Philosophy  of  Right   (hereafter  PR  ),  trans.  T.M.  Knox  (Oxford:   Clarendon  Press, 
1967),   261-62  and  SW,   VII,  237-38.   
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In  "Pleasure  and  Necessity,"  Hegel  contrasts  the  ethical  unity  involved  in  love  to  whatever  it  is 
that  makes  individuals  separate.   In  a  very  obscure  passage,  he  says,  "But  here  this  element 
which  gives  to  both  a  separate  actuality  is  rather  the  category,  a  being  which  is  essentially  in  the 
form  of  thought.    It  is  therefore  the  consciousness   of  independence—let  it  be  natural 
consciousness,  or  consciousness  developed  into  a  system  of  laws—which  preserves  the 
individuals  each  for  himself."     If  this  passage  is  not  intended  to  refer  explicitly  to  the  Kantian 
15
categorical  imperative,  it  is  at  least  the  case  that  the  categorical  imperative  is  one  example  of 
what  Hegel  is  talking  about.   Kantian  practical  reason  certainly  grounds  the  separateness  and 
independence  of  the  individual.   It  roots  the  individual  in  a  transcendental  sphere  apart  and 
makes  the  individual  the  source  of  all  law—even  a  system  of  laws.   Each  individual  is  taken  to  be 
a  supreme  lawgiver  out  of  which  can  arise  a  kingdom  of  ends.   Kant  says,  
 
By  a  “kingdom”  I  understand  the  union  of  di erent  rational  beings  in  a  system  by  common 
laws.   Now  since  it  is  by  laws  that  ends  are  determined  as  regards  their  universal  validity, 
hence,  if  we  abstract  from  the  personal  di erences  of  rational  beings,  and  likewise  from  all 
the  content  of  their  private  ends,  we  shall  be  able  to  conceive  all  ends  combined  in  a 
systematic  whole  …     
16
 
15    PhS,   218  (italics  in  text)  and  GW,   IX,  199. 
16    Here  I  prefer  the  Abbott  translation,  see  Fundamental  Principles  of  the  Metaphysic  of 
Morals ,   trans.  T.K.  Abbott  (Indianapolis:   Bobbs-Merrill,  1949),  50  and  KGS,   IV,  433;  for  the  Beck 
translation,  see  F,   51.  
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For  Kant,  to  achieve  the  universal,  to  produce  a  kingdom  of  ends,  to  live  in  ethical  unity  with 
others  under  a  system  of  laws,  we  must  abstract  from  the  personal  interests  and  private  ends  of 
human  beings;  we  must  withdraw  into  the  individuality  and  apartness  of  practical  reason.   Are 
we  really  going  to   nd  unity  with  others  in  this  way?   We  would  seem  to  be  moving  away  from 
unity  toward  the  separate,  individual,  and  isolated. 
Hegel  is  suggesting  that  Kantian  practical  reason  is  less  likely  to  be  successful  in  producing 
the  ethical  union  it  seeks  and  more  likely  to  produce  separateness  and  isolation  than  is  love, 
which  indeed  has  already  achieved,  Hegel  says,  the  "unity   of  itself  and  the  other 
self-consciousness"—it  has  already  achieved  the  universal.      Love's  unity  with  the  other 
17
self-consciousness  is  certainly  a  movement  away  from  individual  isolation  toward  the  universal, 
and  if  love  expands,  pushes  toward  an  even  larger  unity  with  others  in  a  kingdom  of  ends  (as  we 
shall  see  that  it  does   in  "The  Law  of  the  Heart"),  it  will  move  further  toward  the  universal.   What 
Hegel  is  trying  to  suggest  here  is  that  there  is  good  reason  to  think  that  love  might  tend  more 
e ectively  toward  unity,  the  overcoming  of  separateness,  the  universal,  the  moral,  than  does 
Kantian  practical  reason. 
When  Kant  discusses  love  in  the  Foundations,   the  Critique  of  Practical  Reason,   and  the 
Metaphysical  Principles  of  Virtue,   he  insists  that  love  as  an  inclination  cannot  be  commanded  as 
a  duty.   We  cannot  have  a  duty  to  do  something  gladly.   Thus,  for  example,  when  Scripture 
17    PhS,   218  (italics  in  text)  and  GW,   IX,  199. 
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commands  us  to  love  our  neighbor  or  our  enemy,  in  Kant’s  view  it  cannot  mean  to  command  love 
as  an  inclination,  but  simply  bene cence  from  duty—not  pathological  love,  but  practical  love.  
18
It  is  quite  clear  to  any  sensible  reader,  however,  that  the  ideal  of  the  Gospels  is  not 
bene cence  from  duty,  but  precisely  love  as  an  inclination.   In  the  Spirit  of  Christianity,   Hegel 
attacks  Kant’s  distortion  of  the  Gospels  and  his  reduction  of  love  to  moral  duty.     In  love,  for 
19
Hegel,  all  thought  of  duty  vanishes.   Love  is  higher  than  law  and  makes  obedience  to  law 
super uous.   Inclination  is  uni ed  with  the  law  and  love  ful lls  the  law  in  such  a  way  that  law  is 
annulled  as  law.   Love  transcends  all  cleavage  between  duty  and  inclination.  
20
Hegel  goes  on  to  argue  that  love  so  transcends  the  law  that  the  Gospels  even  suggest  that  we 
do  not  want  to  be  conscious  of  any  action  as  a  duty  because  that  would  mean  the  "intrusion  of 
something  alien,  resulting  in  the  impurity  of  the  action  …  "     It  is  not,  as  for  Kant,  inclination 
21
that  introduces  impurity.     Duty  introduces  the  impurity.   A  charitable  action  done  out  of  love 
22
could  be  spoiled  if  one  started  to  think  of  it  as  a  duty.   But  Hegel  goes  even  further  than  this. 
18    F,   15-16  and  KGS,   IV,  399.   CPrR,   86  and  KGS,   V,  83.    MPV,   60-61,  70,  113-14  and 
KGS,   VI,  401-2,  410,  449-50.   Indeed,  Kant  even  counsels  “moral  apathy,”  a  lack  of  emotion,  which, 
however,  is  to  be  distinguished  from  indi erence;  MPV,   68  and  KGS,   VI,  408. 
19    Spirit  of  Christianity  and  Its  Fate,   in  On  Christianity:   Early  Theological  Writings,   trans. 
T.M.  Knox  (Gloucester,  MA:   Peter  Smith,  1970),  205-24  and,  for  the  German,  Hegels  theologische 
Jugendschriften   (hereafter  HTJ  ),  ed.  H.  Nohl  (Frankfurt  am  Main:   Minerva,  1966),  261-75. 
20   Spirit  of  Christianity ,   212-14  and  HTJ,   266-68. 
21    Spirit  of  Christianity,   219,  also  see  220  and  HTJ,   272,  273. 
22    MPV,   12  and  KGS,   VI,  213. 
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Since  duty  and  inclination  have  been  uni ed  and  all  opposition  overcome,  he  says,  the  law  can 
"be  taken  up  ( aufgenommen  )  into  love."     Very  interestingly,  this  can  be  seen  as  exactly  the 
23
reverse  of  what  Allison  calls  Kant’s  incorporation  thesis.   In  Religion  Within  the  Limits  of  Reason 
Alone,   Kant  writes,  
 
freedom  of  the  will  ( Willkür  )  is  of  a  wholly  unique  nature  in  that  an  incentive  can 
determine  the  will  ( Willkür  )  to  an  action  only  so  far  as  the  individual  has  incorporated 
( aufgenommen  )  it  into  his  maxim   (has  made  it  the  general  rule  in  accordance  with  which 
he  will  conduct  himself);  only  thus  can  an  incentive,  whatever  it  may  be,  co-exist  with  the 
absolute  spontaneity  of  the  will  ( Willkür  )  (i.e.,  freedom).   
24
 
Thus,  for  Kant,  love  may  determine  our  will  in  a  moral  act,  but  only  insofar  as  it  is 
incorporated  into  a  maxim,  that  is,  only  insofar  as  it  becomes  bene cence  from  duty  or  practical 
love.   Whereas  Hegel’s  view  seems  to  be  that  in  the  ideal  case  duty  could  determine  our  will  but 
only  insofar  as  it  had  been  taken  up  into  love. 
I   nd  Hegel’s  view  much  more  acceptable  than  Kant’s,  but,  whatever  one  decides  on  this 
issue,  it  is  quite  clear  that  Hegel  is  not,  as  Ameriks  and  Allison  seem  to  suggest  he  is,  merely 
23    Spirit  of  Christianity,   225  and  HTJ,   277. 
24   Religion  Within  the  Limits  of  Reason  Alone   (hereafter  RWLRA  ) ,  trans.  T.M.  Greene  and 
H.H.  Hudson  (New  York:   Harper  &  Row,  1960),  19  (last  italics  in  the  text)  and,  for  the  German, 
KGS,   VI,  23-24.   Allison  39-40. 
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attacking  a  crudely  understood  notion  of  the  opposition  of  duty  to  inclination.     Hegel  is  taking 
25
on  Kant’s  subtlest  and  most  considered  views  and  attempting  to  show  that,  even  so,  duty  involves 
an  abstract  and  alien  distance  that  falls  short  of  the  ethical  union  achievable  by  love. 
Nevertheless,  I  de nitely  do  not  want  to  suggest  that  in  the  Phenomenology   Hegel  is  simply 
holding,  as  he  may  have  been  at  moments  in  the  Spirit  of  Christianity,   that  love  is  moral  and  that 
Kantian  practical  reason  is  not.   Hegel  goes  on  to  recognize  (again  with  Faust,  Faust's  love  for 
Gretchen,  and  her  death  in  mind)  that  the  life  of  pleasure  is  a  life  of  necessity,  fate,  destiny—even 
of  death  and  destruction.   Here  Hegel  might  seem  to  have  fallen  back  into  the  crude  view  that 
inclination  and  desire  are  simply  opposed  to  the  moral—and  are  heteronomous,  determined,  part 
of  a  realm  of  causal  necessity,  and  so  forth. 
But  Hegel  is  much  more  careful  than  this.   We  must  attend  more  closely  to  the  way  in  which 
he  understands  fate.   He  says,  "necessity,  fate,  and  the  like,  is  just  that  about  which  we  cannot  say 
what   it  does,  what  its  speci c  laws  and  positive  content  are,  because  it  is  …  a  relation   that  is 
simple  and  empty,  but  also  irresistible  and  imperturbable,  whose  work  is  merely  the  nothingness 
of  individuality."     Fate  is  not  to  be  identi ed  with  ordinary  causal  determinism.   Fate  is  more 
26
like  chance.   It  is  certainly  nothing  that  a  scientist  can  predict  ahead  of  time—because  we  cannot 
say  what  the  laws  are.   Yet  a  life  at  the  mercy  of  chance  can  certainly  be  experienced  as  a  cruel 
fate.   Chance  is  not  at  all  like  the  regular  and  predictable  causal  determinism  to  be  expected  in 
25    K.  Ameriks,  “The  Hegelian  Critique  of  Kantian  Morality,”  in  New  Essays  on  Kant,   ed.  B. 
den  Ouden  and  M.  Moen  (New  York:   Peter  Lang,  1987),  194-97.   Allison,  184-85. 
26    PhS,   219  (italics  in  text)  and  GW,   IX,  200. 
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the  Kantian  realm  of  phenomenal  appearance,  yet,  Hegel  is  suggesting,  the  total  absence  of 
predictability  and  control  is  just  as  much,  or  more,  a  necessity,  a  fate,  a  heteronomy.   
If  this  is  conceded,  then  it  will  be  very  interesting  to  notice  that  while  Kant  usually  holds  that 
freedom  has  its  own  laws,  at  least  in  some  places  he  explains  freedom  as  independence  from  the 
laws  of  nature,  liberation  from  all  compulsion,  the  absence  of  all  rules.     For  Hegel,  I  suggest, 
27
freedom  as  absence  of  law  (perhaps  even—Hegel  will  suggest  as  we  proceed—  freedom  that  is 
unable  to  give  us  its  laws)  can  be  seen  as  fate.   We  cannot  say  what  it  does—it  is  blind, 
imperturbable,  and  irresistible.   To  be  cut  o   from  the  world  is  very  likely  to  end  up  at  the  mercy 
of  the  world.   In  Hegel's  view,  to  the  extent  that  the  Kantian  transcendental  self  is  separate  from 
the  concrete  causal  world,  to  the  extent  that  it  is  cut  o   from  the  empirical,  it  risks  subjecting 
itself  to  the  mercy  of  fate—or  at  least  seriously  contributes  to  this.   Fate  occurs  because  we  turn 
away  from  the  world,  leave  it  to  itself,  to  chance,  and  thus  end  up  at  the  mercy  of  chance,  which 
appears  as  an  uncontrollable  necessity.   If  this  is  so,  it  spells  disaster  for  Kant.   Fate,  though  it 
arises  from  freedom,  subverts  freedom.   If  you  are  subject  to  fate  you  are  not  self-determined.   If 
the  self  has  a  destiny,  if  it  is  at  the  mercy  of  fate,  if  it  is  the  plaything  of  chance,  the  self  becomes 
alien  to  itself.   Heteronomy  would  emerge  within  the  autonomous  self. 
Fate  can  be  compared  to  history.   History  is  very  central  to  Hegel's  concept  of  Sittlichkeit. 
The  sociocultural  realm  is  the  historical  product  of  human  activity,  a  product  that  in  turn 
transforms  and  develops  human  beings  themselves,  a  realm  which  they  can  come  to  understand 
27   Critique  of  Pure  Reason   (hereafter  CPR  ),  A447=B475;  I  have  used  the  N.  Kemp  Smith 
translation  (New  York:   St.  Martin's  Press,  1965)  and  KGS,   III-IV,  but  cite  the  standard  A  and  B 
edition  pagination  so  that  any  edition  may  be  used.   Allison,  20.   Also  CPrR,   100  and  KGS,   V,  97. 
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and  in  which  they  can  come  to  be  at  home  and  thus  free.   Sittlichkeit   is   rst  beginning  to  emerge 
here  in  Chapter  V  of  the  Phenomenology,   and  fate  is  the   rst,  simplest,  thinnest  view  of  history. 
We  have  nothing  but  purely  individual  consciousnesses,  their  drives,  passions,  desires,  and  the 
clashes  between  them—all  understood  as  something  completely  uncontrolled,  ununderstood, 
mere  chaos,  mere  chance.   Such  a  view  of  history  emerges  because  we  view  the  world  only  from 
the  inadequate  perspective  of  individual  consciousness  and  are  unable  to  see  how  consciousness 
can  understand  let  alone  produce  or  control  its  historical  world—it  merely  su ers  it.   Two 
sections  further  on  in  the  Phenomenology ,   in  "Virtue  and  the  Way  of  the  World,"  we  will  already 
have  moved,  I  shall  argue,  to  a  more  complex  view  of  history,  the  view  Kant  spells  out  in  his 
"Idea  for  a  Universal  History,"  where  fate  will  turn  into  providence.   In  other  words,  history  will 
appear  rationally  directed.   To  speak  of  fate  is  to  say  there  is  no  rationality—no  order,  direction, 
or  control—involved. 
 
III   
In  the  next  section  of  Chapter  V,  "The  Law  of  the  Heart  and  the  Frenzy  of  Self-Conceit,"  we 
move  from  Goethe's  Faust   to  his  Werther,   and  we  get  a  more  complicated  moral  consciousness 
that  still  seeks  pleasure,  but  not  merely  its  own.   Its  pleasure  is  to  bring  pleasure  to  all  hearts.   As 
in  "Pleasure  and  Necessity,"  love  rather  e ectively  tends  toward  the  universal  and  it  is  also  the 
case  that  it  is  inclined  to  do  so.   The  Law  of  the  Heart,  then,  seeks  to  promote  the  welfare  of  all 
humanity  as  a  universal  end  and  it  takes  pleasure  in  doing  so.   There  is  a  lawlike  attitude  here.  
28
This  consciousness  acts  upon  a  Kantian  categorical  imperative.   Or,  as  Hegel  puts  it,  this  heart 
28    PhS,   221-22  and  GW,   IX,  202-3.  
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“has  within  it  a  law  …  “     In  other  words,  it  takes  up  or  incorporates  the  law:   what  this  heart 
29
“realizes  is  itself  the  law,  and  its  pleasure  is  therefore  at  the  same  time  the  universal  pleasure  of 
all  hearts.   To  it  the  two  are  undivided;  its  pleasure  is  what  conforms  to  the  law,  and  the 
realization  of  the  law  of  universal  humanity  procures  for  it  its  own  particular  pleasure.”  
30
Compare  this  to  Kant,  who  in  the  Foundations   says,  
 
To  be  bene cent  when  we  can  is  a  duty;  and  besides  this,  there  are  many  minds  so 
sympathetically  constituted  that,  without  any  other  motive  of  vanity  or  self-interest,  they 
 nd  a  pleasure  in  spreading  joy  around  them,  and  can  take  delight  in  the  satisfaction  of 
others  so  far  as  it  is  their  own  work.   But  I  maintain  that  in  such  a  case  an  action  of  this 
kind,  however  proper,  however  amiable  it  may  be,  has  nevertheless  no  true  moral  worth,  but 
is  on  a  level  with  other  inclinations,  for  example,  the  inclination  to  honor,  which  … 
deserves  praise  and  encouragement,  but  not  esteem.  
31
 
  Acting  from  inclination  has  no  true  moral  worth.   But,  on  the  other  hand,  acting  from  duty 
and  being  inclined  to  do  so  is  an  ideal  of  holiness.   Kant  says,  “to  love  one’s  neighbor  means  to 
like  to  practice  all  duties  toward  him.   The  command  which  makes  this  a  rule  cannot  require  that 
29    PhS,   221  and  GW,   IX,  202. 
30    PhS,   222  and  GW,   IX,  203. 
31    Here  I  prefer  Abbott’s  translation;  see  F   (Abbott  trans.),  15-16  and  KGS,   IV,  398.   For 
Beck’s  translation,  see  F,   14.   Also,  see  MPV,   49-50  and  KGS,   VI,  391. 
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we  have  this  disposition  but  only  that  we  endeavor  after  it.”     The  perfect  agreement  of  duty  and 
32
inclination  is  an  
 
ideal  of  holiness  …  unattainable  by  any  creature  …  yet  an  archetype  which  we  should 
strive  to  approach  …  in  an  uninterrupted  in nite  progress.   If  a  rational  creature  could  ever 
reach  the  stage  of  thoroughly  liking  to  do  all  moral  laws,  it  would  mean  that  there  was  no 
possibility  of  there  being  in  him  a  desire  which  could  tempt  him  to  deviate  from  them  …  To 
such  a  level  of  moral  disposition  no  creature  can  ever  attain.    
33
 
Such  holiness  is  “the  supreme  condition  of  the  highest  good.”     The  highest  good,  for  Kant,  sets 
34
as  its  ideal  a  perfect  agreement  between  the  moral  law   and  inclination—  in  other  words,  it  is  a 
law   of  the  heart.    And  since  the  satisfaction  of  our  inclinations  would  amount  to  happiness,  the 
highest  good  also  requires  the  reconciliation  of  virtue  and  happiness.   If  happiness  did  not 
accompany  virtue,  we  certainly  would  not  have  the  highest   good  for  human  beings.   But  virtue 
and  happiness  would  seem  to  be  irreconcilable.   Happiness  requires  the  regular  satisfaction  of 
our  inclinations,  interests,  and  desires.   But  to  be  virtuous,  we  certainly  cannot  be  determined  by 
inclination,  interest,  or  desire.   We  must  be  determined  by  the  moral  law.   And  there  is  no  reason 
to  think  that  virtue  will  produce  happiness.   If  we  lived  solely  in  a  phenomenal  world,  Kant 
thinks,  there  would  be  no  reason  to  expect  virtue  and  happiness  to  accord.   Only  if  there  is  also 
32    CPrR,   86  and  KGS,   V,  83. 
33    Ibid. 
34    CPrR,   126  and  KGS,   V,  122. 
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an  intelligible  world  can  we  imagine  such  reconciliation  as  an  ideal,  and  only,  Kant  thinks,  if  we 
postulate  a  God  who  will  see  to  it  that  nature  is  ordered  such  that  while  we  act  virtuously  our 
desires  will  at  the  same  time  be  satis ed  so  that  we  can  also  be  happy,  and  happy  in  proportion  to 
our  worthiness  to  be  happy,  that  is,  in  proportion  to  our  virtue.  
35
What  we  have  here  then,  Hegel  insists,  and  Kant  fully  admits,  is  an  ideal .    Inclination  ideally 
ought  to  agree  with  the  moral  law—but  this  is  not  something  actually  achieved.     Hegel  says  that 
36
the  law  is  still  separated  from  the  heart  and  exists  on  its  own  such  that  most  of  humanity,  while 
accepting  the  law,  will  not  actually   nd  it  in  unity  with  the  heart  and  so  will  have  to  dispense 
with  actual  enjoyment  in  obeying  it.   Thus  the  law  will  start  to  become  for  the  heart  a  mere  show 
that  will  not  seem  to  deserve  the  authority  and  reality  it  is  supposed  to  have.     Hegel's  point  in  all 
37
of  this,  I  believe,  is  that  we  have  not  transcended  all  cleavage  between  objective  law  and 
subjective  feeling  so  as  to  annul  the  law  as  law—we  have  not  achieved  Sittlichkeit.    We  merely 
have  a  Kantian  ideal  of  unity  between  law  and  inclination.   And  this  ideal,  Hegel  wants  to  go  on 
to  argue,  is  not  likely  to  work  in  actual  cases.   
From  the  start,  the  law  of  the  heart  has  hated  and  opposed  any  imposition  from  outside  (by 
authorities,  the  government,  whatever)  of  laws  that  o end  the  heart.   All  law  must  agree  with  the 
35   CPrR,   111-19,  128-33  and  KGS,   V,  107-15,  124-28.   For  a  di erent  but  interesting 
treatment  of  the  Law  of  the  Heart,  see  J.N.  Shklar,  Freedom  and  Independence:   A  Study  of  the 
Political  Ideas  of  Hegel’s  Phenomenology  of  Mind   (Cambridge:   Cambridge  University  Press, 
1976),  102-9. 
36    CPrR,   86  and  KGS,   V,  83.   MPV,   151  and  KGS,   VI,  482. 
37    PhS,   222-23  and  GW,   IX,  203-4. 
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heart—that  is  the  only  acceptable  law.   Kant  would  at  least  seem  to  be  in  agreement  with  this.   In 
Religion  Within  the  Limits  of  Reason  Alone,   he  claims  that  we  have  a  practical  knowledge  that 
rests  “solely  upon  reason  and  …  lies  as  close  to  every  man,  even  the  most  simple,  as  though  it 
were  engraved  upon  his  heart—a  law,   which  we  need  but  name  to   nd  ourselves  at  once  in 
agreement  with  everyone  else  regarding  its  authority,  and  which  carries  with  it  in  everyone’s 
consciousness  unconditioned   binding  force,  to  wit,  the  law  of  morality.”     Where  does  this 
38
law—capable  of  producing  such  complete  agreement  as  if  engraved  upon  our  very  hearts—come 
from?   In  the  Foundations,   the  third  formulation  of  the  categorical  imperative  tells  us  that  each 
rational  being  is  a  supreme  legislator,  “subject  only  to  his  own,  yet  universal,  legislation,  and  … 
only  bound  to  act  in  accordance  with  his  own  will,  which  is,  however,  designed  by  nature  to  be  a 
will  giving  universal  laws.”    
39
Kant  sees  no  trouble  at  all  in  claiming  that  we  are  subject  to  no  law  but  our  own,   yet  that  we 
can  legislate  for  all.    Lacking  Sittlichkeit,   Hegel  thinks  there  will  be  a  great  deal  of  trouble  to  be 
found  here.   In  the  Metaphysical  Principles  of  Virtue,   Kant  does  admit  that  there  is  a  distinction 
we  must  notice.   In  ethics  the  “law  is  conceived  as  the  law  of  one’s  own   will  and  not   of  the  will 
in  general,  which  could  also  be  the  will  of  others;  in  the  latter  case  such  a  law  would  give  rise  to 
a  juridical  duty  …  “     This  seems  to  suggest  that  while  a  law  one  gives  oneself  can  be  one’s  own, 
40
others  might  not  take  it  as  their  own.    Indeed,  Kant  says  that  I  can  “be  forced  by  others  to 
actions  which  are  directed  as  means  to  an  end,  but  I  can  never  be  forced  by  others  to  have  an  end; 
38    RWLRA,   169  ( rst  italics  added;  second  in  the  text)  and  KGS,   VI,  181. 
39    F,   51  and  KGS,   IV,  432.  
40    MPV,   47  (my  italics)  and  KGS,   VI,  389.  
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I  alone  can  make  something  an  end  for  myself.…  for  I  can  have  no  end  except  of  my  own 
making.”     Thus,  while  it  is  my  duty,  for  Kant,  to  promote  the  happiness  of  others  as  my  end,    it 
41 42
does  not  seem  that  this  could  cause  others  to  accept  it  as  their  end.   In  fact,  in  Religion  Within  the 
Limits  of  Reason  Alone,   it  seems  to  be  the  case  that  in  an  ethical  commonwealth  not  only  will  it 
be  the  case  that  others  will  not  accept  my  legislation  as  their  own  but  that  even:  
 
the  people,  as  a  people,  cannot  itself  be  regarded  as  the  law-giver.   For  in  such  a 
commonwealth  all  the  laws  are  expressly  designed  to  promote  the  morality   of  actions 
(which  is  something  inner,   and  hence  cannot  be  subject  to  public  human  laws),  whereas,  in 
contrast,  these  public  laws—and  this  would  go  to  constitute  a  juridical  commonwealth—are 
directed  only  toward  the  legality   of  actions,  which  meets  the  eye,  and  not  towards  (inner) 
morality  …     
43
 
However,  it  would  seem  that  Kant  wants  it  both  ways.   The  state  cannot  force  disposition  to 
virtue,  yet  it  seems  to  count  on  it,  
 
it  would  be  a  contradiction  …  for  the  political  commonwealth  to  compel  its  citizens  to 
enter  into  an  ethical  commonwealth,  since  the  very  concept  of  the  latter  involves  freedom 
from  coercion.   Every  political  commonwealth  may  indeed  wish  to  be  possessed  of  a 
41    MPV,   38-39  and  KGS,   VI,  381. 
42    MPV,   46,  43  and  KGS,   VI,  388,  385-86. 
43    RWLRA,   90  (italics  in  text)  and  KGS,   VI,  98-99. 
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sovereignty,  according  to  laws  of  virtue,  over  the  spirits  [of  its  citizens];  for  then,  when  its 
methods  of  compulsion  do  not  avail  …  their  dispositions  to  virtue  would  bring  about  what 
was  required.   But  woe  to  the  legislator  who  wishes  to  establish  through  force  a  polity 
directed  to  ethical  ends!   For  in  so  doing  he  would  not  merely  achieve  the  very  opposite  of 
an  ethical  polity  but  also  undermine  his  political  state  and  make  it  insecure.   
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The  legislator  wants  everyone  to  take  the  legislator’s  law  as  their  own,  be  disposed  toward  it, 
take  it  as  a  law  of  their  heart,  but  woe  to  the  legislator  who  tries  to  legislate  such  a  law  of  the 
heart.   We  are  certainly  not  very  far  along  here  toward  the  ideal  of  agreement  between  duty  and 
inclination,  virtue  and  happiness,  the  law  and  the  heart.   And  so,  as  Hegel  puts  it,  what  will 
happen  is  that  others  will  not   nd  the  law  to  be  “the  ful llment  of  the  law  of  their   hearts,  but 
rather  that  of  someone  else;  and,  precisely  in  accordance  with  the  universal  law  that  each  shall 
 nd  in  what  is  law  his   own  heart,  they  turn  against  the  reality  he   set  up,  just  as  he  turned  against 
theirs.   Thus,  just  as  the  individual  at   rst   nds  only  the  rigid  law,  now  he   nds  the  hearts  of  men 
themselves,  opposed  to  his  excellent  intentions  and  detestable.”     Others  cannot  recognize 
45
themselves  in  the  law  of  my  heart.   If  my  legislation  were  to  stand  as  a  universal  ordinance, 
others  would   nd  it  merely  my  imposition  and  would  turn  against  it  as  the  very  law  of  the  heart 
demands.  
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44    RWLRA,  87  (brackets  in  text)  and  KGS,   VI,  95-96. 
45    PhS,   224  (italics  in  text)  and  GW,   IX,  204. 
46    PhS,   223-24  and  GW,   IX,  203-4. 
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What  Hegel  is  suggesting  here,  and  it  is  something  he  will  further  develop  in  the  section 
entitled  "The  Spiritual  Animal  Kingdom,"  is  that  Kant  was  quite  correct  in  the  view  that  the  law 
must  come  from  your  own  reason—  though  Kant  was  not  fully  aware  of  what  this  actually 
implied.   It  is  not  enough  that  laws  just  be  rational.   They  must  be  your  own.    Human  beings  are 
very  much  motivated  by  what  is  their  own—their  desire  to  express  themselves  and  recognize 
their  own  doing  in  the  result.   And  if  forced  to  chose  between  what  is  rational  or  universal  and 
what  is  their  own  they  will   nd  such  a  situation  oppressive.   Lauer  argues  that  the  trouble  with 
the  law  of  the  heart  is  that  it  does  not  act  on  the  categorical  imperative.     That  is  seriously 
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mistaken.   The  law  of  the  heart  does  involve  a  categorical  imperative  and  that   is  precisely  what 
is  wrong  with  it.   Hegel  is  attacking  the  categorical  imperative.   
But  the  worst  is  yet  to  come.   Hegel  thinks  that  Kantian  morality  will  always  result  in  an  alien 
situation,  one  that  always  establishes  a  law  that  is  not  your  own—even  if  you   yourself  instituted 
the  law.   In  the  Spirit  of  Christianity,   Hegel  said,  the  "consciousness  of  having  performed  his 
duty  enables  the  individual  to  claim  universality  for  himself;  he  intuits  himself  as  universal,  as 
raised  above  himself  qua   particular  and  above  the  whole  sphere  of  particularity,  i.e.,  above  the 
mass  of  individuals.…  and  this  self-consciousness  of  his  is  as  foreign  to  the  action  as  men’s 
applause.”     In  the  “Law  of  the  Heart,”  Hegel  says  that  in  carrying  out 
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the  law  of  his  heart.…  the  law  has  in  fact  escaped  the  individual;  it  directly  becomes  merely 
the  relation  which  was  supposed  to  be  got  rid  of.   The  law  of  the  heart,  through  its  very 
47    Lauer,  158-59. 
48    Spirit  of  Christianity,   219-20  (italics  in  text)  and  HTJ,   272. 
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realization,  ceases  to  be  a  law  of  the  heart.    For  in  its  realization  it  …  is  now  a  universal 
power  for  which  this  particular  heart  is  a  matter  of  indi erence,  so  that  the  individual,  by 
setting  up  his  own  ordinance,  no  longer   nds  it  to  be  his  own.   Consequently,  what  the 
individual  brings  into  being  through  the  realization  of  his  law,  is  not  his   law  …  but  actually 
is  for  him  an  alien  a air  …  a  superior  power  which  is  [not]  only  alien  to  him,  but  one 
which  is  hostile.  
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After  all,  if  the  legislation  of  public  law,  as  we  have  seen  Kant  himself  say  in  Religion  Within  the 
Limits  of  Reason  Alone,   cannot  be  taken  to  demand  anything  inner,  if  the  legislator  cannot 
expect  to  legislate  disposition  to  virtue  (without  undermining  the  political  state  and  making  it 
insecure),  then  what  di erence  does  it  make  who  the  legislator  is—you  yourself  or  someone 
else?   As  soon  as  a  public  law  is  established  that  must  keep  its  distance  in  this  way  from  the 
inner,  from  disposition,  from  your  own,  from  the  heart,  such  a  law  (Hegel  is  perfectly  correct  in 
claiming)  will  escape  the  individual  and  become  an  alien  power—even  for  the  very  individual 
who  established  the  law. 
The  problem  here  is  that  we  do  not  have  Sittlichkeit.    We  have  instead  a  modern  separation  of 
universal  law  and  the  heart—a  separation  perfectly  expressed  in  Kantian  ethics.   Moreover, 
Kantian  ethics  simply  would  not  accept  Sittlichkeit.    The  Kantian  individual  would  certainly   nd 
the  "divine  and  human  ordinance[s]"  of  the  ancient  world,  which  were  taken  "as  an  accepted 
authority",  to  be  instead,  as  Hegel  puts  it,  "a  dead  authority  in  which  not  only  its  own  self  …  but 
also  those  subject  to  that  ordinance  would  have  no  consciousness  of  themselves  …  "   In  short, 
49    PhS,   223  (italics  in  text)  and  GW,   IX,  203. 
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Kantian  ethics  would   nd  the  objective  laws  of  the  ancient  world  to  be  an  alien  authority—it 
would   nd  them  to  be  heteronomous.   It  would  see  nothing  of  itself,  its  own,   in  those  laws. 
Custom  and  tradition,  laws  based  on  religion  or  mythology,  for  Kant,  could  not  be  forms  of 
rational  autonomy.   They  would  be  other,  heteronomous,  alien.   What  this  completely  misses,  in 
Hegel’s  view,  is  that  ancient  law  was  "really  animated  by  the  consciousness  of  all",  it  was  in  fact 
"the  law  of  every  heart.…  for  this  means  nothing  else  than  that  individuality  becomes  an  object 
to  itself  in  the  form  of  universality  in  which,  however,  it  does  not  recognize  itself."     The  divine 
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and  human  laws  of  the  ancient  world,  for  Hegel,  were  constituted  by  the  cultural  and  historical 
action  of  the  citizens  themselves  and  embedded  in  their  customs,  traditions,  practices,  and 
feelings—they  were   their  own   laws.   They  had  an  objective  and  universal  form  such  that 
citizens  did  not  see  that  they  had  constituted  them,  but  they  were   the  law  of  every  heart.   The 
universal  and  feelings  were  not  separate  here.   Their  unity  was  not  a  mere  ideal;  their  unity  was 
actual.     As  Hegel  put  it  in  an  earlier  text, 
51
 
As  free  men  the  Greeks  and  Romans  obeyed  laws  laid  down  by  themselves,  obeyed  men 
whom  they  had  themselves  appointed  to  o ce,  waged  wars  on  which  they  had  themselves 
decided,  gave  their  property,  exhausted  their  passions,  and  sacri ced  their  lives  by 
thousands  for  an  end  which  was  their  own.   They  neither  learned  nor  taught  [a  moral 
50    PhS,   224-25  and  GW,   IX,  205. 
51    Also,  see  Hegel's  discussion  of  folk  religion  in  the  "Tübingen  Essay"  of  1793,  in  Three 
Essays,  1793-1795,   trans.  P.  Fuss  and  J.  Dobbins  (Notre  Dame,  IN:   University  of  Notre  Dame 
Press,  1984),  49  and  GW,   I,  103.   
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system]  but  evinced  by  their  actions  the  moral  maxims  which  they  could  call  their  very 
own.   In  public  as  in  private  and  domestic  life,  every  individual  was  a  free  man,  one  who 
lived  by  his  own  laws.   The  idea  ( Idee  )  of  his  country  or  of  his  state  was  the  invisible  and 
higher  reality  for  which  he  strove,  which  impelled  him  to  e ort;  it  was  the   nal  end  of  his 
world  or  in  his  eyes  the   nal  end  of  the   world,  an  end  which  he  found  manifested  in  the 
realities  of  daily  life  or  which  he  himself  co-operated  in  manifesting  and  maintaining. 
Confronted  by  this  idea,  his  own  individuality  vanished;  it  was  only  this  idea’s 
maintenance,  life  and  persistence  he  asked  for,  and  these  were  things  which  he  himself 
could  make  realities.   
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The  cultural  and  historical  construction  of  institutions  and  laws  will  be  traced  at  length  in 
Chapter  VI  of  the  Phenomenology—  from  the  ancient  world  through  the  French  Revolution.   And 
in  Chapter  VI,  the  further  we  move  into  the  modern  and  Kantian  world,  the  more  it  will  be  the 
case  that  our  laws  are  not  seen  as  our  own.   In  the  ancient  world,  laws  were  our  own—they  were 
laws  of  the  heart. 
The  failure  of  the  law  of  the  heart  in  the  modern  world  leads  to  the  frenzy  of  self-conceit. 
You  blame  the  domination  that  arises  from  the  law  of  the  heart  not  on  yourself—your  heart  is 
52    Positivity  of  the  Christian  Religion ,   in  On  Christianity:   Early  Theological  Writings,   154 
(italics  and  parentheses  in  the  text)  and  GW,   I,  367-68. 
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pure,  all  you  want  is  the  happiness  of  others.   The  fact  that  they  do  not  accept  this,  the  fact  that 
they  see  it  as  domination,  is  not  due  to  you;  it  is  a  general  perversion  of  the  law  of  the  heart:    
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The  consciousness  which  sets  up  the  law  of  its   heart  therefore  meets  with  resistance  from 
others,  because  it  contradicts  the  equally  individual   laws  of  their  hearts;  and  these  others  in 
their  resistance  are  doing  nothing  else  but  setting  up  and  claiming  validity  for  their  own 
law.   The  universal  that  we  have  here  is,  then,  only  a  universal  resistance  and  struggle  of  all 
against  one  another,  in  which  each  claims  validity  for  his  own  individuality,  but  at  the  same 
time  does  not  succeed  in  his  e orts,  because  each  meets  with  the  same  resistance  from  the 
others,  and  is  nulli ed  by  their  reciprocal  resistance.   What  seems  to  be  public  order,   then, 
is  this  universal  state  of  war,  in  which  each  wrests  what  he  can  for  himself,  executes  justice 
on  the  individuality  of  others  and  establishes  his  own,  which  is  equally  nulli ed  through  the 
action  of  the  others.   It  is  the  'way  of  the  world',  the  show  of  an  unchanging  course  that  is 
only  meant   to  be  a  universality  …    
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The  "Way  of  the  World"  or  the  "Course  of  the  World"—in  German,  "der  Weltlauf"—  is  a  term 
that  Hegel   nds  in  Kant.     Certainly,  Hegel's  description  of  the  "Way  of  the  World"  is  intended 
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53    PhS,   226  and  GW,   IX,  206.   Compare  with  Kant’s  RWLRA,   25,  32-33  and  KGS,   VI,  30, 
37. 
54    PhS,   227  (italics  in  text)  and  GW,   IX,  207. 
55     Kant  writes,  "Thus  we  can  say  that  the  real  things  of  past  time  are  given  in  the 
transcendental  object  of  experience;  but  they  are  objects  for  me  and  real  in  past  time  only  in  so  far  as 
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to  refer  to  an  arrangement  central  to  Kant's  political  philosophy  and  philosophy  of  history. 
Compare  the  above  passage  from  Hegel  to  the  following  passage  from  Kant's  Perpetual  Peace , 
 
many  say  a  republic  would  have  to  be  a  nation  of  angels,  because  men  with  their  sel sh 
inclinations  are  not  capable  of  a  constitution  of  such  sublime  form.   But  precisely  with 
these  inclinations  nature  comes  to  the  aid  of  the  general  will  established  on  reason,  which  is 
revered  even  though  impotent  in  practice.   Thus  it  is  only  a  question  of  a  good  organization 
of  the  state  (which  does  lie  in  man's  power),  whereby  the  powers  of  each  sel sh  inclination 
are  so  arranged  in  opposition  that  one  moderates  or  destroys  the  ruinous  e ect  of  the  other. 
The  consequence  for  reason  is  the  same  as  if  none  of  them  existed,  and  man  is  forced  to  be 
a  good  citizen  even  if  not  a  morally  good  person. 
The  problem  of  organizing  a  state,  however  hard  it  may  seem,  can  be  solved  even  for  a 
race  of  devils,  if  only  they  are  intelligent.   The  problem  is:   "Given  a  multitude  of  rational 
beings  requiring  universal  laws  for  their  preservation,  but  each  of  whom  is  secretly  inclined 
to  exempt  himself  from  them,  to  establish  a  constitution  in  such  a  way  that,  although  their 
I  represent  to  myself  (either  by  the  light  of  history  or  by  the  guiding-clues  of  causes  and  e ects)  that 
a  regressive  series  of  possible  perceptions  in  accordance  with  empirical  laws,  in  a  word,  that  the 
course  of  the  world  [ der  Weltlauf  ],  conducts  us  to  a  past  time-series  as  condition  of  the  present 
time—a  series  which,  however,  can  be  represented  as  actual  not  in  itself  but  only  in  the  connection  of 
a  possible  experience";  CPR,   A495;  also  A450=B478.   Also,  see  MPV,   15  and  KGS,   VI,  216.   Also 
see  Luther’s  translation  of  the  Bible,  Ephesians  2:2.  
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private  intentions  con ict,  they  check  each  other,  with  the  result  that  their  public  conduct  is 
the  same  as  if  they  had  no  such  intentions." 
A  problem  like  this  must  be  capable  of  solution;  it  does  not  require  that  we  know  how  to 
attain  the  moral  improvement  of  men  but  only  that  we  should  know  the  mechanism  of 
nature  in  order  to  use  it  on  men,  organizing  the  con ict  of  the  hostile  intentions  present  in  a 
people  in  such  a  way  that  they  must  compel  themselves  to  submit  to  coercive  laws.   Thus  a 
state  of  peace  is  established  in  which  laws  have  force.…   
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The  assumption  of  the  ancient  world  was  always  that  in  a  good  city  the  universal  and  the 
heart  (law  and  morality,  on  the  one  hand,  and  inclination,  interest,  custom,  tradition,  on  the  other) 
would  agree— Sittlichkeit   was  the  norm.   In  the  modern  world,  the  assumption  is  the  reverse,  that 
the  universal  and  the  heart  are  separate  and  will  diverge,  though  the  heart  can  be  manipulated  so 
as  to  produce  the  universal.   For  Kant,  the  ideal  of  holiness  is  that  the  universal  and  the  heart, 
duty  and  inclination,  agree.   This  ideal  is  the  supreme  condition  of  the  highest  good—what  Hegel 
calls  the  law  of  the  heart.   But  it  is  only  an  ideal  and  all  we  end  up  with  is  the  frenzy  of 
self-conceit,  the  organization  of  a  race  of  devils  into  the  appearance  of  a  nation  of  angels,  public 
order  that  is  really  a  state  of  war,  the  reciprocal  nulli cation  of  con icting  interests  appearing  as 
the  universal.   At  any  rate,  we  have  already  arrived  at  the  next  section:   "Virtue  and  the  Way  of 
the  World."  
 
56    Perpetual  Peace   (hereafter  PP  ),  in  On  History,   ed.  L.W.  Beck  (Indianapolis: 
Bobbs-Merrill,  1963),  112-13  and  KGS,   VIII,  366-67. 
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IV   
The  law  of  the  heart,  then,  dissolves  merely  into  virtue.   In  other  words,  the  consciousness  now 
before  us  no  longer  takes  pleasure  in  acting  on  the  universal;  it  no  longer  combines  inclination 
and  the  moral  law.   It  simply  does  its  duty.   All  we  have  is  ordinary  Kantian  virtue,  and  it  stands 
opposed  to  the  way  of  the  world,  the  con ict  of  particular  interests  that  it  intends  to  manipulate  in 
order  to  produce  virtuous  results.   Like  Lauer  and  Hyppolite,  many  commentators  seem  to  think 
that  "Virtue  and  the  Way  of  the  World"  is  about  Don  Quixote.     I  think  there  is  a  passing 
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reference  to  Quixote  in  one  passage,    but  that  is  not  what  the  section  is  about.    No  commentator 
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that  I  am  aware  of  sees  what  the  section,  at  least  in  my  opinion,  is  so  very  clearly  about,  namely, 
Kant's  philosophy  of  history. 
In  his  "Idea  for  a  Universal  History,"  Kant  tells  us  that  there  are  two  forces  at  work  in  history. 
The   rst  is  the  con ict  of  particular  interests;  the  second  is  morality.   And  both,  for  Kant,  lead  to 
the  very  same  end—peace,  justice,  and  a  league  of  nations.
   
59
57    Lauer,  162-63.   J.  Hyppolite,  Genesis  and  Structure  of  Hegel's  Phenomenology  of  Spirit , 
trans.  S.  Cherniak  and  J.  Heckman  (Evanston,  IL:   Northwestern  University  Press,  1974),  290. 
58    PhS,   231  and  GW,   IX,  210. 
59    "Idea  for  a  Universal  History"  (hereafter  IUH  ),  in  On  History,   18-19  and  KGS ,   VIII, 
24-25.   PP,   112-13  and  KGS ,   VIII,  366-67.   Also,  see  my  earlier  treatment  of  these  matters  in  Marx 
and  Modern  Political  Theory   (hereafter  M&MPT  )   (Lanham,  MD:   Rowman  &  Little eld,  1993), 
Chapters  4-5. 
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      Kant  thinks  that  we   nd  two  propensities  within  human  beings.   He  sums  these  up  as 
"unsocial  sociability."   Human  beings  have  an  unsocial  propensity—a  propensity  to  sel shness 
and  lack  of  concern  for  the  interests  of  others.   But  they  also  have  a  social  propensity. 
  
  They  must 
cooperate  with  others  in  society  to  satisfy  their  needs.   These  two  propensities 
together—associating  with  others,  yet  being  sel sh  and  unsocial—produce  con ict,  competition, 
and  even  war.   While  there  is  an  obvious  negative  side  to  this  con ict,  there  is  also  a  positive 
side.   Con ict  and  sel shness,  after  all,  drive  us  to  accomplish  things;  competition  sharpens  our 
abilities.   We  are  driven  toward  the  development  of  our  powers,  capacities,  and  talents.
  
60
      So,  for  Kant,  we  are  driven  to  society  by  sociability  and  the  need  for  others.   Once  in  society, 
competition  and  sel shness  set  in  and  our  powers  and  capacities  develop.   This  development,  for 
Kant,  will  eventually  lead  to  the  society  of  morality,  justice,  and  peace  that  he  is  after.  
  
   The 
61
notion  that  con icting  self-interest  leads  toward  what  morality  demands  is  quite  similar  to,  and 
perhaps  Kant  even  gets  it  from,  Adam  Smith.   In  a  market  economy,  each  pursues  their  own 
self-interest.   Nevertheless,  for  Smith,  this  self-seeking  not  only  produces  a  common  good,  it 
does  so  more  e ectively  than  if  individuals  had  consciously  and  cooperatively  sought  the 
common  good.   Aggressive  self-seeking,  given  the  interdependence  of  each  upon  all,  produces  a 
national  capital,  the  wealth  of  the  nation,  that  common  good ,   out  of  which  each  struggles  to  gain 
60    IUH,   15  and  KGS,   VIII,  20-21.   
61    Ibid.   PP,   106,  111  and  KGS,   VIII,  360-61,  365.   
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their  particular  share.   Self-seeking  produces  this  common  good  through  an  "invisible  hand";  that 
is,  behind  our  backs  and  despite  our  intentions.
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      For  Kant,  there  is  also  an  "unsocial  sociability"  at  the  international  level.   We   nd  the 
assertion  of  national  self-interest  that  drives  nations  toward  aggression  and  war.   Yet  there  is  also 
an  important  form  of  sociability  among  nations,  namely,  their  interest  in  commerce  and  trade.   It 
is  the  dynamic  interplay  between  these  factors  that  will  lead  to  a  league  of  nations,  peace,  and 
international  law. 
As  wars  become  more  serious,  destructive,  and  expensive,  they  become  more  uncertain. 
They  come  into  con ict  with  ever-increasing  economic  interests—they  interfere  with  trade.   As 
world  trade  grows,  as  nations  become  more  interdependent,  war  poses  an  ever-greater  threat  to 
the  smooth  functioning  of  the  international  market.   At  the   rst  sign  of  war,  other  nations  will 
intervene  to  arbitrate,  to  quash  the  war,  in  order  to  secure  their  own  national  commercial 
interests.   This  is  the   rst  step  toward  a  league  of  nations.  
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      The  second  force  at  work  in  history  is  morality.   We  can  easily  see  that  morality,  the 
categorical  imperative,  would  demand  fair  laws,  just  constitutions,  and  an  end  to  wars.   We  could 
not  will  to  universalize  war,  unjust  constitutions,  and  unfair  laws.   Morality  would  also  demand  a 
league  of  nations.  
   
And  morality,  for  Kant,  is  one  of  the  forces  at  work  in  history.   Moreover,  the 
64
other  force,  we  have  already  seen,  drives  us  toward  the  very  same  point  that  morality  does.   War 
62    A.  Smith,  Wealth  of  Nations,   ed.  E.  Cannan  (New  York:   Modern  Library,  1937),  423. 
63    IUH,   23  and  KGS,   VIII,  28.   PP,   114  and  KGS,   VIII,  368.   
64    PP,   100  and  KGS,   VIII,  356. 
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among  nations  and  commercial  interest  drive  us  toward  peace,  law,  and  a  league  of  nations.   Both 
morality  and  war  converge  toward  the  same  end.
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      In  the  long  passage  quoted  above  from  Perpetual  Peace,   we  see  a  good  example  of  these  two 
forces  at  work.   Kant  argues  that  sel sh  inclinations  must  be  arranged  so  that  they  cancel  each 
other  out  and  thus  devils  can  end  up  with  a  society  that  might  have  seemed  possible  only  for 
those  with  the  morality  of  angels.   Both  forces  are  necessary  for  Kant.   One  without  the  other  is 
not  enough.   Reason  and  morality  alone,  he  says,  would  never  achieve  our  end.   Humans  are  too 
corrupt.  
   
On  the  other  hand,  con ict  or  war  alone  will  never  actually  make  us  moral.   Con ict 
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and  war  drive  us  toward  peace  and  legality.   But  this  is  only  to  say  that  our  self-interest  drives  us 
toward  peace  and  law;  and  self-interest  is  not  moral  for  Kant. 
If,  for  Kant,  we  are  able  to  form  an  idea  for  a  universal  history;  if  we  can  see  that  in  history 
the  dynamic  tension  between  war  and  commerce  will  lead  us  unconsciously  toward  the  same 
point  that  reason  and  morality  would  consciously  lead  us;  then  Kant  thinks  that  the  second  force 
at  work  in  history,  our  own  reason,  our  own  morality,  can  begin  to  guide  this  historical 
development  toward  its  goal.     History  can  be  rationally  guided.   We  can  have  providence,    not 
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just  fate. 
65    IUH,   18-19  and  KGS,   VIII,  24-25.   PP,   111-13  and  KGS,   VIII,  365-67.   
66    IUH,   17-18  and  KGS,   VIII,  23. 
67    IUH,   22  and  KGS,   VIII,  27. 
68    IUH,   25  and  KGS,   VIII,  30. 
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Hegel  clearly  has  Kantian  morality  and  philosophy  of  history  in  mind  as  he  plays  out  the 
interaction  between  the  two  consciousnesses  that  stand  before  us:   virtue  and  the  way  of  the 
world.     Virtue,  he  says,  is  the  consciousness  that  universal  law  is  essential  and  that 
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individuality—which  is  to  say,  inclination  and  particular  interest—must  be  sacri ced  to  the 
universal  and  thus  brought  under  its  discipline  and  control.   Virtue  wills  to  accomplish  a  good 
that  is  not  yet  actual;  it  is  an  ought  that  must  be  realized.   And  it  can  be  realized  only  through 
virtue's  nullifying  of  individuality.     In  the  Metaphysical  Principles  of  Virtue,   Kant  says  that  the 
70
“moral  capacity  of  man  would  not  be  virtue  if  it  were  not  actualized  by  the  strength  of  one’s 
resolution  in  con ict  with  powerful  opposing  inclinations.   Virtue  is  the  product  of  pure  practical 
reason  insofar  as  the  latter,  in  the  consciousness  of  its  superiority  (through  freedom),  gains 
mastery  over  the  inclinations.”     He  also  says  you  must  “dare  to  do  battle  against  all  the  forces  of 
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nature  within  you  and  round  about  you,  and  to  conquer  them  when  they  come  into  con ict  with 
your  moral  principles.”   
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For  the  way  of  the  world,  on  the  other  hand,  individuality  takes  itself   to  be  essential—which 
is  to  say  that  it  pursues  self-interest.   It  seeks  its  own  inclinations,  pleasures,  and  enjoyment,  and 
in  doing  so  it  subordinates  the  universal  to  itself.   For  Kant,  as  we  saw,  both  morality  and  the 
con ict  of  particular  interests  converge  toward  the  same  universal  end.   So  also,  Hegel  says,  the 
69   Hegel  was  also  in uenced  by  Adam  Smith  and  James  Steuart.   For  a  fuller  treatment  of  these 
matters,  see  my  M&MPT,   123-30,  149-50  n.36. 
70    PhS,   228-30  and  GW,   IX,  208-10. 
71   MPV,   145  and  KGS,   VI,  477. 
72    MPV,   152;  see  also  64-65,  67-68  and  KGS,   VI,  483,  405,  408. 
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way  of  the  world,  through  the  con ict  of  particular  interests,  achieves  the  universal—the  very 
same  universal  that  virtue  seeks.     For  Kant,  it  was  morality's  task  to  guide  the  historical  con ict 
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of  particular  interests  and  to  hasten  it  toward  its  end.   For  Hegel  too,  virtue  attempts  to  assist  the 
way  of  the  world  to  realize  the  universal.   
At  this  point,  however,  Hegel's  disagreement  with  Kant  begins  to  sharpen.   Hegel  argues  that, 
in  fact,  virtue's  assistance  is  unnecessary;   the  way  of  the  world  is  quite  capable  of  realizing  the 
universal  on  its  own.   The  Quixotic  assistance  of  the  knight  of  virtue  is  a  sham.     Virtue  wants  to 
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bring  the  good  into  existence  by  the  sacri ce  of  individuality  or  particular  interest.   But  it  is 
individuality,  the  con ict  of  particular  interests,  that  actually  realizes  the  universal.   Virtue  denies 
the  accomplishments  of  the  way  of  the  world  and  attempts  to  claim  them  for  itself.   Virtue  always 
wants  to  treat  the  universal  as  something  that  does  not  yet  exist,  something  that  ought  to  be , 
something  it  will  bring  about,  rather  than  as  something  which  already  is.   Sittlichkeit   is  emerging 
here.   Hegel  says: 
 
Virtue  in  the  ancient  world  had  its  own  de nite  sure  meaning,  for  it  had  in  the  spiritual 
substance   of  the  nation  a  foundation  full  of  meaning,  and  for  its  purpose  an  actual  good 
already  in  existence.   Consequently,  too,  it  was  not  directed  against  the  actual  world  as 
against  something  generally  perverted,   and  against  a  'way  of  the  world'.   But  the  virtue  we 
73    PhS,   228-29,  235  and  GW,   IX,  208-9,  213. 
74    PhS,   230-32  and  GW,   IX,  209-11. 
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are  considering  has  its  being  outside  of  the  spiritual  substance,  it  is  an  unreal  virtue,  a 
virtue  in  imagination  and  name  only,  which  lacks  that  substantial  content.
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For  Hegel,  we  must  drop  the  idea  that  virtue  exists  only  as  a  principle,  an  ought,  which  as  yet 
has  no  actual  existence  and  which  must  be  brought  into  existence  through  the  sacri ce  of 
individuality,  particular  interest,  or  passion.   Hegel's  objection  to  Kantian  morality  is  that  it  is 
abstract,  outside  the  world,  an  ought,  and  that  it  believes  that  only  it  is  capable  of  realizing  the 
universal.     It  has  severed  itself  from  the  concrete  actual  world  of  interest  and  passion,  and  faces 
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it  as  an  other.    From  this  superior  position  it  wants  to  direct  the  world.   Instead,  morality  must  be 
rooted  in  the  world.   
Or,  to  put  this  another  way,  Kant's  philosophy  of  history  and  his  ethics  are  written  from  the 
perspective  of  individual  consciousness—the  perspective  that  there  are  only  individual 
consciousnesses.   Morality,  for  Kant,  is  a  matter  of  individual  will  abstracted  from  the  concrete 
actual  world.   Certainly,  for  Kant,  inclinations,  interests,  and  passions  are  part  of  the  world  and 
are  to  be  carefully  distinguished  from  the  individual  moral  will  if  the  individual  is  to  be 
self-determined  and  thus  free.   It  is  this  separation  that  Hegel  objects  to.   It  involves  the  “creation 
of  distinctions  that  are  no  distinctions  …  “     Kant  has  no  notion  of  Sittlichkeit ,   which  Hegel  is 
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trying  to  push  us  towards  here.   Sittlichkeit   is  morality  embedded  in  a  concrete  cultural  world. 
For  Hegel,  virtue  and  the  way  of  the  world,  particular  interest  and  the  universal,  morality  and  the 
75    PhS,   234  (italics  in  text)  and  GW,   IX,  212-13. 
76    PhS,   235  and  GW,   IX,  213. 
77    PhS,   234  and  GW,   IX,  212. 
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concrete  world,  are  not  separate  opposed  realities  externally  related  to  each  other.   They  are 
internally  related  as  parts  of  a  single  cultural  reality  that  already  exists;  it  is  not  something  that 
merely  ought  to  be  realized. 
We  must  abandon  the  perspective  of  individual  consciousness  and  adopt  a  perspective  in 
which  the  concrete  world  and  individual  consciousness  are  seen  as  two  parts  of  one  spiritual 
unity.   Individual  consciousness  is  the  internalization  of  the  sociocultural  world  and  the 
sociocultural  world  is  the  outcome  and  expression  of  the  actions  of  individual  consciousnesses. 
Each  develops  in  interaction  with  the  other,  and  each  transforms  the  other. 
Hegel  agrees  with  the  Kantian  and  Smithian  notion  that  a  con ict  of  particular  interests  leads 
to  the  universal.   What  Hegel  does  not  accept  is  that  this  can  be  adequately  understood  at  the 
level  of  individual  consciousness.   For  it  to  be  correctly  understood,  we  must  move  to  the  level  of 
culture.   Culture  explains  how  individual  interest—the  concrete  way  of  the  world—is  connected 
to  virtue.   The  interaction  among  particular  interests  gives  rise  to  a  set  of  institutions,  a  world, 
which  develops  a  spiritual  life  of  its  own  and  which  reacts  back  upon  and  molds  those  individual 
consciousnesses  and  leads  them  to  virtue.    Particular  interest  and  virtue  are  not  two  externally 
related  realms  eternally  distinguished  from  each  other.   They  are  internally  related  as  two 
interacting  parts  within  a  single  cultural  unity.   Each  produces  and  molds  the  other.   Virtue  is 
simply  mistaken  in  thinking  itself  independent  and  outside  this  spiritual  reality,  superior  to  it,  and 
thus  able  to  manipulate  and  guide  particular  interests  from  above.   Particular  interests  as  they  are 
formed  by  their  cultural  world  actually  take  an  interest   in  virtue  and  virtue  is  something  that 
properly  engages  and  develops  out  of  our  passions,  inclinations,  and  interests.   Moreover,  there  is 
no  ought  that  is  above,  outside,  independent  and  that  the  individual  will  must  set  out  to  realize. 
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Morality  already  exists  as  the  spiritual  unity  that  encloses  us,  that  is  our  very  being,  and  that  is 
embedded  in  our  feelings,  desires,  and  interests.   Hegel's  task  is  to  reconcile  us  to  what  is   by 
allowing  us  to  correctly  understand  what  is.    His  aim  is  not  to  transform  reality  in  accordance 
with  an  abstract  and  independent  ought.   Virtue  is  not  something  as  yet  nonexistent  that  we  ought 
to  realize;  it  is  something  already  existing  that  we  must  come  to  more  deeply  recognize  and 
rationally  grasp  in  our  actual  sociocultural  practices.   As  Hegel  puts  it  in  the  Philosophy  of  Right, 
 
After  all,  the  truth  about  Right,  Ethics,  and  the  state  is  as  old  as  its  public  recognition  and 
formulation  in  the  law  of  the  land,  in  the  morality  of  everyday  life,  and  in  religion.   What 
more  does  this  truth  require—since  the  thinking  mind  is  not  content  to  possess  it  in  this 
ready  fashion?   It  requires  to  be  grasped  in  thought  as  well;  the  content  which  is  already 
rational  in  principle  must  win  the  form   of  rationality  …   
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At  any  rate,  Kantian  practical  reason  ends  in  failure.   It  thinks  it  can  direct  the  course  of  the 
world,  but  it  turns  out  that  this  is  self-delusion.   The  course  of  the  world  does  better  than  does 
virtue. 
 
V   
"Virtue  and  the  Way  of  the  World,"  then,  achieves  a  universal  end  brought  about  by  the  action  of 
particular  interests.   What  this  shows  us,  Hegel  suggests  in  the  next  section,  entitled  "The 
78    PR,   3  (italics  in  text),  11-12  and  SW,   VII,  22,  35-36. 
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Spiritual  Animal  Kingdom  and  Deceit,  or  the  Fact  Itself,"    is  that  action  can  only  be  judged  by 
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what  it  does.   Only  the  action  achieved  is  a  reality,  not  the  idea  that  is  supposed  to  guide  the 
action  from  above  or  outside.   We  cannot  determine  the  reality  of  the  action  until  it  takes 
place—we  cannot  see  the  universal  moral  result  in  the  particular  interests  until  the  con icting 
particular  interests  have  actually  realized  the  universal.   The  reality  of  any  potentiality,  capacity, 
or  talent  is  its  realization,  not  what  we  hope  or  desire  or  intend,  but  what  becomes,  what  is 
actually  realized  in  action.   The  talent  of  engineers  or  artists  is  seen  in  the  bridges  they  build  or 
the  paintings  they  paint,  not  merely  in  their  hopes,  dreams,  or  intentions  concerning  possible 
bridges  or  paintings.  
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In  an  earlier  section,  Hegel  discussed  physiognomy,  the  doctrine  propounded  by  Lavater  to 
the  e ect  that  the  inner  character  of  individuals  is  expressed  outwardly  in  their  bodily  form  and 
facial  expressions.   If  we  wonder  why  Hegel  spent  so  much  time  attacking  what  to  most  people  is 
obviously  a  pseudoscience,  part  of  the  answer  is  that  Hegel's  attack  against  physiognomy  hits  at 
much  more  than  just  physiognomy—it  hits  at  Kant's  ethics  as  well.   Physiognomy  regards  the 
deed  and  its  performance  as  inessential  and  irrelevant.   It  regards  only  inner  intentions  as 
essential  and  thinks  it  can  discern  these  inner  truths  through,  say,  facial  expressions.  
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Physiognomy  pushes  this  way  too  far.   As  Hegel  puts  it,  "'If  anyone  said,  "You  certainly  act  like 
79    Miller  translates  "die  Sache  selbst"   as  the  "'matter  in  hand'  itself,"  or  elsewhere  as  the  "heart 
of  the  matter."   I  think  a  better  translation  is  simply  "the  fact  itself." 
80    PhS,   239-40  and  GW,   IX,  217-18.   See  also,  L,   253  and  SW,   VII,  314.   PR,   83  and  SW,  
VII,  182.   Also  Wood,  137-39,  143,  151. 
81    PhS,   191-92  and  GW,   IX,  176-77. 
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an  honest  man,  but  I  see  from  your  face  that  you  are  forcing  yourself  to  do  so  and  are  a  rogue  at 
heart";  without  a  doubt,  every  honest  fellow  to  the  end  of  time,  when  thus  addressed,  will  retort 
with  a  box  on  the  ear.'"    
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But  how  far  from  this  is  Kant,  who  in  the  Foundations   says,  "when  moral  worth  is  in 
question,  it  is  not  a  matter  of  actions  which  one  sees  but  of  their  inner  principles  which  one  does 
not  see."     How  is  it,  then,  that  we  can  be  sure  of  these  inner  intentions?   Well,  that  is  something 
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of  a  problem  even  for  Kant, 
 
if  we  attend  to  our  experience  of  the  way  men  act,  we  meet  frequent  and,  as  we  ourselves 
confess,  justi ed  complaints  that  we  cannot  cite  a  single  sure  example  of  the  disposition  to 
act  from  pure  duty.…  It  is  in  fact  absolutely  impossible  by  experience  to  discern  with 
complete  certainty  a  single  case  in  which  the  maxim  of  an  action,  however  much  it  may 
conform  to  duty,  rested  solely  on  moral  grounds  and  on  the  conception  of  one's  duty.   It 
sometimes  happens  that  in  the  most  searching  self-examination  we  can   nd  nothing  except 
the  moral  ground  of  duty  which  could  have  been  powerful  enough  to  move  us  to  this  or  that 
good  action  and  to  such  great  sacri ce.   But  from  this  we  cannot  by  any  means  conclude 
with  certainty  that  a  secret  impulse  of  self-love,  falsely  appearing  as  the  idea  of  duty,  was 
not  actually  the  true  determining  cause  of  the  will.…  our  concern  is  not  whether  this  or  that 
was  done  but  that  reason  of  itself  and  independently  of  all  appearances  commands  what 
ought  to  be  done.   Our  concern  is  with  actions  of  which  perhaps  the  world  has  never  had  an 
82    PhS,   193  and  GW,   IX,  178. 
83    F,   23  and  KGS,   IV,  407. 
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example,  with  actions  whose  feasibility  might  be  seriously  doubted  by  those  who  base 
everything  on  experience,  and  yet  with  actions  inexorably  commanded  by  reason.   
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This  simply  will  not  work.   How  are  we  to  establish  the  existence  of  the  sort  of  intelligible 
self  that  could  ground  such  pure  intentions,  unsullied  by  self-love,  of  which  the  world  has 
perhaps  never  seen  an  example,  but  which  are  inexorably  commanded  by  reason?   If  we  accepted 
the  existence  of  a  noumenal  realm  that  could  keep  reason  and  its  pure  intentions  apart  in  a 
beyond  where  they  could  be  considered  an  inner  essence  behind  the  outer  appearance  of 
self-love,  we  might  begin  to  argue  for  the  existence  of  such  an  intelligible  self.   But  Hegel  will 
not  concede  the  existence  of  such  a  realm  and,  indeed,  most  modern  commentators   nd  the  very 
concept  to  be  an  embarrassment  which  they  either  ignore  or  avoid.   We  might  instead  try  to  argue 
that  without  such  an  intelligible  self  and  the  freedom  it  implies,  we  could  not  understand  the 
possibility  of  morality.     But  Hegel  has  just  shown  us  that  this  is  not  so.   We  do  not  need  a  virtue 
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to  direct  the  course  of  the  world.   The  particular  interests  that  make  up  the  course  of  the  world 
are  quite  able  on  their  own  to  realize  the  universal.   Furthermore,  by  Kant’s  own  admission  in  the 
passage  just  quoted,  we  cannot  even  cite  a  single  sure  example  of  an  action  done  from  pure  duty. 
How  then  can  we  claim  to  establish  that  there  is  or  must  be  an  intelligible  self,  the  seat  of  a 
84    F,   22-24  and  KGS,   IV,  406-8.   Also,  see  CPR,   A551=B579.   For  Kant,  in  the  Critique  of 
Judgment,   the  ideal  of  artistic  beauty  requires  the  visible  expression  in  bodily  form  of  the  moral 
ideas  that  rule  us  inwardly;  Critique  of  Judgment ,   trans.  J.H.  Bernard  (New  York:   Hafner,  1966),  72 
and  KGS,   V,  235. 
85    As,  for  example,  F,   63-81  and  KGS,   IV,  444-62. 
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reason  that  of  itself  and  independently  of  all  appearances  is  able  to  issue  inexorable  commands  of 
pure  duty?   
All  we  have  is  a  deed,  a  doing,  an  action.   There  is  no  self  residing  inside  us  in  a  beyond  or  in 
a  second  world  or  that  somehow  escapes  the  supposed  heteronomy  of  the  phenomenal  world.   All 
we  have  here,  as  Hegel  puts  it,  is  a  distinction  that  is  no  distinction—a  distinction  that  is  purely 
nominal.  
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For  Hegel,  there  is  no  way  to  get  a  hold  of  inner  intentions—certainly  not  if  that  is  supposed 
to  allow  us  to  measure  or  critique  or  avoid  the  deed.   The  deed  is  not  a  mere  outer  expression  of 
an  inner  intention.   The  deed  is  what  it  is:   murder,  theft,  bravery.   It  is  what  can  be  said  of  it.   We 
should  not  fancy  that  we  are  something  else  than  what  we  have  done.   We  should  not  explain 
away  our  deed  by  appeal  to  intentions—something  "meant,"  something  conjectured.   What  we 
are,  our  essence,  is  the  work  we  have  done.    
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Let  us  say,  then,  that  action  is  a  self-expression—not  of  a  transcendental  self,  but  simply  the 
expression  or  realization  of  a  capacity  or  talent—and  that  this  is  the  way  we  must  understand 
individuality.   The  self  or  the  individual  is  simply  what  is  expressed,  what  is  realized,  in  the 
action  or  work.   The  self  is  not  some  mysterious  entity  behind  or  beyond  its  action.   We  cannot 
appeal  to  an  inner  self  to  measure  the  deed.   That  would  be  to  go  beyond  the  essential  nature  of 
the  work  which  is  simply  to  be  the  realization  of  a  potential.   It  will  follow  from  this  that  there  is 
no  room  even  for  exaltation,  lamentation,  or  repentance  over  the  work.   Any  of  this  would  be  to 
presuppose  a  self-in-itself  that  was,  or  might  have  been,  or  that  failed  to  be,  realized.   But  there  is 
86    PhS,   233-34  and  GW,   IX,  212. 
87    PhS,   194,  191  and  GW,   IX,  178-79,  176-77. 
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no  such  self-in-itself.   The  original  nature  or  potential  of  the  individual  can  be  nothing  but  what 
actually  gets  carried  out,  expressed,  realized  in  the  world.   We  cannot  lament  that  our  work  does 
not  live  up  to  our  potential.   Our  potential  is  nothing  but  what  we  are  able  to  realize  in  our  work. 
The  individual  is  what  the  individual  actually  does,  not  what  they  merely  hope,  dream,  or  intend.
    This  is  a  view  that  academics  are  not  likely  to   nd  congenial.   We  are  all  deeply  convinced 
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that  we  are  capable  of  far  more  and  much  greater  work  than  we  ever  turn  out.   Such  is  our 
self-delusion.  There  is  no  room  for  a  Kantian  self-in-itself  behind  or  beyond  or  distinguished 
from  what  is  actually  realized. 
In  one  of  the  examples  that  Kant  gives  of  a  moral  act  in  the  Foundations,   he  discusses 
talents.   Hegel,  I  suggest,  is  arguing  that  Kant's  treatment  of  talents  is  seriously   awed.   Kant 
asks  if  the  moral  law  could  allow  us  to  will  to  leave  a  useful  talent  undeveloped,  and  concludes 
that  it  will  not  allow  us  to  do  so.   We  cannot  universalize  not  developing  such  a  talent.   The 
categorical  imperative  demands  that  we  develop  such  talents.    In  the  Metaphysical  Principles  of 
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Virtue,   Kant  says  that  we  have  a  duty  to  cultivate  our  natural  powers,  capacities,  and 
endowments.  
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The  moral  law,  then,  commands  us  to  take  as  our  end  the  realization  of  such  speci c  talents. 
For  Hegel  this  is  simply  incoherent.   It  is  impossible  to  determine  what  this  end  might  be  before 
it  has  actually  been  realized.   What  talent  I  might  have,  what  my  potential  might  be,  can  only  be 
88    PhS,   241-42  and  GW,   IX,  219-20. 
89    F,   40-41  and  KGS,   IV,  422-23.   See  also  Onora  (formerly  Nell)  O’Neill,  Acting  on 
Principle:   An  Essay  on  Kantian  Ethics   (New  York:   Columbia  University  Press,  1975),  84-89. 
90    MPV,   44,  108  and  KGS,   VI,  386-87,  444. 
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discovered  in  what  I  am   nally  able  to  make  real  through  action.   Do  I  have  the  potential  to  write 
a  book  that  is  truly  a  masterpiece  and  thus  would  have  a  moral  obligation  to  keep  at  it  until  I 
actually  produce  that  book?   Or  do  I  merely  have  the  potential  to  write  a  few  valuable  and 
interesting  things  and  when  I  have  done  so  would  best  be  advised  to  move  on  to  another  topic? 
Or  is  it  the  case  that  my  talent  really  lies  in  a  completely  di erent   eld  altogether  and  that  I  am 
wasting  my  time  in  writing.   You  cannot  know  what  your  end  is,  what  your  talent  is,  what 
potential  you  have  until  you  have  actually  carried  it  out.   
Bernard  Williams  tells  a  story  of  a  Gauguin-like   gure  who  while  concerned  with  the  de nite 
and  pressing  human  claims  made  upon  him  and  what  is  involved  in  their  being  neglected 
nevertheless  turns  away  from  them  in  order  to  realize  his  gifts  as  a  painter  and  to  pursue  his  art. 
This  involves  a  good  deal  of  risk.   Whether  or  not  he  succeeds  in  developing  this  gift,  whether  he 
actually  has  a  signi cant  gift,  he  cannot  tell  for  sure  ahead  of  time.   Thus,  whether  his  action  can 
be  justi ed  depends,  certainly  in  part,  on  whether  he  actually  has  and  is   nally  able  to  develop 
this  gift.   Any  justi cation,  then,  will  at  least  in  part  have  to  be  retrospective.     But  for  Kant  the 
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categorical  imperative  would  certainly  seem  to  require  that  we  know  and  will  our  end  ahead  of 
time.   We  must  act  on  a  maxim—a  maxim  that  we  formulate,  analyze,  and   nd  to  be 
universalizable  ahead  of  time.   If  we  do  not  have  such  a  rational  principle  to  act  upon,  our  act 
will  be  heteronomous,  at  the  whim  of  the  way  of  the  world—not  free  or  moral.   However,  Allison 
argues  that: 
 
91    B.  Williams,  Moral  Luck:   Philosophical  Papers  1973-1980   (Cambridge:   Cambridge 
University  Press,  1981),  21-24. 
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since  maxims  are  self-imposed  rules,  one  cannot  make  something  one’s  maxim  without  in 
some  sense  being  aware  of  it  as  such,  or  at  least  without  the  capacity  to  become  aware  of 
it.…  This  does  not  entail,  however,  either  that  we  possess  a  “Cartesian  certainty”  regarding 
our  motivation  (which  Kant,  of  course,  denies)  or  that  we  must  explicitly  formulate  our 
maxims  to  ourselves  before  acting.   The  point  is  rather  a  conceptual  one:   namely,  that  I 
cannot  act  on  a  principle  (according  to  the  conception   of  law)  without  an  awareness  of  that 
principle,  although  I  need  not  be  explicitly  aware  of  myself  as   acting  on  that  principle. 
Moreover,  it  must  be  possible  in  subsequent  re ection  to  discover  and  articulate  (albeit  not 
in  an  indefeasible  way)  the  maxims  on  which  one  acts  …   
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But  where  we  cannot  know  ahead  of  time  what  our  potential,  our  talent,  and  thus  our  end  is, 
it  does  not  make  sense  to  say  that  in  subsequent  re ection  we  could  discover  and  articulate  the 
92    Allison,  90  (italics  in  the  text).   This  may  well  lead  to  trouble.   Later  in  the  text,  Allison 
discusses  actions  that  are  motivated  both  by  duty  and  by  inclination.   He  argues  that  it  is  a  mistake  to 
take  Kant  as  holding  that  motives  or  incentives  are  psychic  forces  that  operate  either  singly  or  in 
cooperation.   For  Kant,  motives  or  incentives  determine  the  will  only  if  taken  up  into  a  maxim 
(Allison,  117).   Let  us  imagine  individuals  who  are  trying  to  decide  whether  they  were  determined 
by  duty  or  inclination  and  who  did  not  formulate  their  maxim  before  acting.   Recall  that  Kant 
himself  claims  that  generally  speaking  we  can  never  be  certain  whether  we  were  motivated  by  duty 
or  inclination.   Can  we  simply  and  unproblematically  accept  what  is  discovered  and  articulated  upon 
subsequent  re ection  concerning  the  maxims  on  which  such  individuals  acted?   Can  we  know  what 
was  taken  up  into  a  maxim  if  no  maxim  was  explicitly  formulated? 
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maxim  on  which  we  acted.   If  it  was  not  possible  to  formulate  a  speci c  maxim  in  the   rst  place, 
it  would  not  be  possible  to  discover  and  articulate  one  in  retrospect.   Instead  of  speci c  maxims, 
Kant  seems  to  have  in  mind  all-purpose  maxims  to  the  e ect  that  we  should  realize  whatever 
useful  talents  we  might  have, 
 
No  principle  of  reason  prescribes  exactly  how  far  one  must  go  in  this  e ort.…  Besides,  the 
variety  of  circumstances  which  men  may  encounter  makes  quite  optional  the  choice  of  the 
kind  of  occupation  for  which  one  should  cultivate  his  talent.   There  is  here,  therefore,  no 
law  of  reason  for  actions  but  only  for  the  maxim  of  actions,  viz.,  “Cultivate  your  powers  of 
mind  and  body  so  as  to  be  able  to  ful ll  all  the  ends  which  may  arise  for  you,  uncertain  as 
you  may  be  which  ends  might  become  your  own.”   
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However,  such  all-purpose  maxims  tell  us  nothing  whatsoever  about  what  it  is  moral  to  do  in  any 
speci c  case  because  we  cannot  know  where  our  talent  lies  or  how  much  talent  we  have  in  any 
speci c  area.   The  categorical  imperative  cannot  tell  me  whether  I  should  keep  working  toward  a 
masterpiece,  switch  topics  often,  or  give  up  writing  altogether? 
Furthermore,  all  of  this  presents  problems  for  the  second  formulation  of  the  categorical 
imperative.   If  it  is  a  duty  to  "treat  humanity,  whether  in  your  own  person  or  in  that  of  another, 
always  as  an  end  and  never  as  a  means  only”,    and  if  as  a  consequence  of  this  we  have  a  duty  to 
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93    MPV,   50-51  and  KGS,   VI,  392. 
94    F,   47  and  KGS,   IV,  429. 
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develop  our  powers,  capacities,  and  talents,    then  we  are  in  trouble.   If  we  cannot  know  what  our 
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talents  are  ahead  of  time,  and  if  to  treat  humanity  as  an  end  requires  that  we  develop  our  talents 
and  those  of  others,  then  we  will  not  know  how  to  act  in  these  cases.   Again,  we  cannot  give  in  to 
Kantian  virtue’s  claim  that  it  must  be  put  in  charge,  that  it  can  survey  the  whole  terrain,  that  it 
will  foresee  what  must  be  done,  either  to  direct  the  way  of  the  world  or  even  to  develop  our 
talents  by  way  of  treating  humanity  as  an  end.   Virtue  must  instead  take  a  very  di erent  stance.   It 
must  deal  with  what  is,  with  actuality,  with  what  has  already  been  actualized.   As  Williams 
suggests,  it  is  largely  retrospective.   We  cannot  simply  and  easily  look  ahead  to  what  Kantian 
virtue  claims  ought   to  be  realized. 
What  do  we  do  then?   Well,  Hegel  thinks  real  people  just  act.   And  he  thinks  Kant  well 
knows  they  do.   Indeed,  in  his  "Idea  for  a  Universal  History,"  Kant  takes  a  very  di erent 
approach  to  the  development  of  talents.   He  holds  that  it  is  simply  self-interest  that  causes  our 
talents  to  develop.   As  in  Adam  Smith's  model  of  a  market  society,  competing  particular  interests 
force  the  development  of  powers,  capacities,  and  talents.   Sel shness  awakens  our  powers  and 
stirs  us  out  of  complacency.   It  moves  us  to  action,  drives  us  to  accomplish  things,  and  develops 
our  potential.     The  way  of  the  world  and  not  virtue  is  what  develops  our  talents.   
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Hegel,  I  suggest,  thinks  that  Kant's  approach  in  the  Foundations   is  senseless  and  that  the 
view  Kant  presents  in  his  "Idea  for  a  Universal  History"  is  correct.   Within  a  set  of 
circumstances,  our  interests  are  formed;  they  lead  us  to  action;  and  we  realize  a  potential.     At 
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95    MPV,   50-51  and  KGS,   VI,  392. 
96    IUH,   15-16  and  KGS,   VIII,  20-21. 
97    PhS,   240  and  GW,   IX,  218. 
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the  same  time,  Hegel  is  trying  to  develop  his  own  view,  namely,  that  acting,  the  development  of 
talents,  is  an  objecti cation  of  the  self.   Only  the  public  product,  only  the  result,  is  the  realization 
of  the  talent.   So  also  the  objecti ed  talent  or  product  (the  bridge  or  painting)  must  be  recognized 
by  others.   An  unrecognized  product  means  a  non-objective,  non-real  talent—merely  your  own 
subjective  opinion  that  you  have  a  talent.   A  talent  that  will  never  be  recognized  is  not  a  real 
talent.    
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We  are  headed  for  a  crisis  here.   There  is  nothing  to  sustain  a  Kantian  self-in-itself.   We  must 
give  up  the  notion  of  a  transcendental  self  grounded  in  a  beyond;  we  must  abandon  the  notion  of 
a  self  that  is  supposed  to  have  powers  and  talents  that  it  should,  but  may  or  may  not,  realize. 
There  is  no  such  self.   It  is  only  in  and  through  the  actual  realization  of  powers,  capacities,  and 
talents  that  a  self  emerges.   The  self  emerges  in  its  objecti cations.   A  self  becomes  real  insofar 
as  it  objecti es  itself  and  is  recognized.   Our  problem  here  is  that  at  the  level  of  individual 
consciousness  the  objecti cations  of  the  self  cannot  gain  adequate  recognition.   
What  we  have,  then,  are  works  in  which  individuals  have  objecti ed  their  powers,  capacities, 
and  talents,  but  which  are  ephemeral  and  unreal  because  other  individuals   nd  them 
unimportant—not  their  expression,  realization,  or  objecti cation—and  thus  do  not  recognize 
them.     At  this  point,  Hegel  begins  to  take  up  the  notion  of  "die  Sache  selbst"—  the  fact  itself. 
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Hyppolite  suggests  that  Hegel  is  distinguishing  between  a  thing  of  perception  ( Ding  )  and  a  thing 
98    PhS,   111  and  GW,   IX,  109.   It  is  certainly  possible  for  real  talent  to  go  unrecognized,  for 
artists,  say,  to  be  ahead  of  their  time,  but  to  hold  that  a  talent  that  will  never  be  able  to  gain 
recognition  is  still  a  talent,  is  simply  self-delusion. 
99    PhS,   245-46  and  GW,   IX,  223. 
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of  spirit  or  culture,  a  human  thing  ( Sache  ).     The  point  that  Hegel  wants  to  move  toward,  I 
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believe,  is  that  facts  are  sociocultural  constructions.   Individuals  act,  express,  objectify 
themselves  (their  powers  and  capacities)  in  a  work.   This  is  what  constitutes  facts.   Facts  are 
constructs,  creations,  interpretations.   Individual  activity  creates  them  through  work,  scholarship, 
research,  experiment,  production,  and  so  forth.   Reality  is  a  spiritual-cultural  substance  formed 
by  individual  action  or  work. 
Take  the  fact  that  "Augustus  was  an  Emperor  of  Rome."   This  might  seem  to  be  just  a  simple 
independently  given  fact.   But  Rome,  its  political  institutions,  and  its  emperors  were  historical 
realities  constructed  by  Romans.   Without  this  historical  construction,  there  would  be  no  Rome, 
no  Roman  emperors,  and  no  Augustus.   For  the  statement  "Augustus  was  an  Emperor  of  Rome" 
to  have  anything  beyond  the  most  trivial  meaning,  we  must  understand  what  Rome  was,  what  its 
political  institutions  were,  and  what  an  emperor  was.   And  to  gain  this  understanding  would 
require  interpretation—interpretation  that  we  could  argue  about  and  disagree  over.   At  a  certain 
point,  our  interpretations  of  our  constructions  may  crystallize  into  what  looks  like  a  simple 
independently  given  fact—the  fact  itself—but  that  is  because  our  di erences  have  paled  and  we 
have  come  to  take  these  interpretations  and  constructions  for  granted.   
At  this  point  in  Chapter  V,  then,  actuality—all  that  is  actual—is  now  identi ed  with  the 
action  or  expression  of  individuals.   The  actual  world  is  the  action  of  all  individuals  expressing 
their  talents  and  objectifying  their  powers  in  works  or  acts.   Consciousness  (at  least  for  us)  now 
100    Baillie's  translation  is  clearer  here:   Phenomenology  of  Mind   (hereafter  PhM  ),  trans.  J.B. 
Baillie  (New  York:   Harper  &  Row,  1967),   431  and  GW,   IX,  223;  for  Miller's  translation,  see  PhS, 
246.   Hyppolite,  309.   
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knows  that  it  constitutes  its  world.   In  working  on  reality,  in  forming  it  as  a  product,  in  expressing 
and  objectifying  our  powers  and  talents,  through  research,  experiment,  work,  and  so  forth,  reality 
is  constituted  by  us. 
The  problem  remaining  here  is  that  we  are  still  at  the  level  of  individual  consciousness  and 
thus  each  individual  only  recognizes  itself  in  the  object  and  only  takes  its  own  objects  to  be 
signi cant.   Others  do  not  recognize  your  object  nor  you  theirs.   What  Hegel  calls  Honest 
Consciousness  responds  to  this  by  holding  that  even  if  it  did  not  bring  a  purpose  to  reality,  did 
not  accomplish  anything  that  others  would  recognize,  did  not  build  a  bridge  or  paint  a  painting, 
but  tried,  “at  least  willed   it,”  well,  that  is  good  enough.   Honest  Consciousness  is  consoled. 
Even  failure  was  an  attempt.     As  for  Kant,  this  consciousness  is  not  motivated  by  results, 
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consequences,  or  the  actual  realization  of  purposes.     Its  concern  is  with  its  attempt,  its 
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intention,  and  the  fact  itself. 
But  this  leads  to  deceit.   Honest  Kantian  consciousness  is  not  as  honest  as  it  claims.   Honest 
Consciousness  would  claim  not  to  be  concerned  with  accomplishments  and  recognition  but 
simply  with  the  fact  itself  and  with  trying  hard—and,  indeed,  this  too  is  the  way  others  regard  it. 
They  assume  that  the  real  issue  is  the  work,  the  fact  itself,  regardless  of  who  accomplished  it.   As 
long  as  we  all  really  tried,  it  does  not  matter  who   actually  made  the  scienti c  discovery  or  who 
gets  the  recognition.   Only  the  discovery  itself  really  matters.   Only  the  advance  of  science 
matters  to  Honest  Consciousness—not  its  own   accomplishment  or  recognition.   Or  so  it  would 
seem,  until  anyone  tries  to  question  Honest  Consciousness's  accomplishment.   Just  see  what 
101    PhS,   247-48  (italics  in  text)  and  GW,   IX,  224-25. 
102    F,   10  and  KGS,   IV,  394. 
 
Hegel’s  Critique  of  Kantian  Practical  Reason 
happens  if  you  try  to  point  out  to  Honest  Consciousness  that  in  fact  you   had  already  made  this 
scienti c  discovery  earlier,  or  even  if  you  claim  credit  for  signi cantly   assisting  in  the  discovery. 
You  will  begin  to  see  that  Honest  Consciousness  has  left  the  position  where  it  claimed  to  be  and 
we  all  thought  it  was.   It  is  really  Honest  Consciousness's  own   doing  that  concerns  it—not 
merely  the  fact  itself.   Honest  Consciousness  wants  the  credit  for  making  the  discovery  itself. 
And  when  others  come  to  see  that  this  is  Honest  Consciousness's  real  intent,  they  feel  deceived. 
However,  their  own  haste  to  assist  demonstrated  just  as  much  that  their  real  concern  was  not 
merely  the  fact  itself  either  but  their  own   desire  to  be  in  on  the  discovery  themselves   and  to  be 
recognized  for  it .    They  wanted  to  deceive  in  just  the  way  they  complain  of  being  deceived.  
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Consciousness  is  not  interested  in  the  fact  itself  regardless  of  who  expresses  it.   
We  might  compare  this  to  Kant,  who,  in  explaining  the  fourth  formulation  of  the  categorical 
imperative  in  the  Foundations ,   argues  that  if  we  were  only  subject  to  moral  laws,  it  would  be 
possible  to  attach  ourselves  to  them  out  of  self-interest—we  could  be  motivated  to  obey  or 
disobey  the  law  out  of  self-interest.   But  if  we  act  as  a  supreme  legislator,  as  we  must,  this 
becomes  impossible.   If  we  were  to  let  our  interest  predominate,  we  would  be  subordinating  the 
law  (and  our  legislation  of  the  law)  to  this  interest.   As  legislators,  then,  we  would  not  be 
supreme.   The  law  would  not  be  supreme.   Our  interest  would  be.   If  we  are  to  act  as  a  supreme 
legislator,  then  interest  must  go.  
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Hegel,  we  must  conclude,  thinks  this  is  deceptive.   Whether  or  not  the  supreme  legislator  is 
motivated  by  self-interest  in  the  sense  that  Kant  has  in  mind  is  not  the  real  issue  because  what  the 
103    PhS,   250  and  GW,   IX,  226-27;  however,  I  prefer  Baillie's  translation,  PhM,   435-36. 
104    F,   50-51  and  KGS,   IV,  432-33. 
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supreme  legislator  is  very  de nitely  interested   in  is  being  the  supreme   legislator,  the  one  who 
issues  the  moral  law.   The  supreme  legislator  is  as  much  or  more  interested  in  its  supremacy  as  it 
is  in  the  categorical  imperative  itself.   What  consciousness  is  interested  in  is  its  own   doing. 
Honest  Consciousness  is  not  interested  in  the  fact  itself  apart  from  the  fact  that  it  came  up  with 
the  fact  itself.   Others  are  the  same  way.   If  they  seek  to  assist  you,  they  do  so  to  get  their  own 
piece  of  the  action.   There  is  a  deception  here.   They  are  not  simply  assisting  you,  but  trying  to 
manifest  their  own  action  and  trying  to  take  credit  for  your  action.   And  you  behave  in  the  same 
way  toward  them. 
However,  it  would  be  a  mistake  to  think  that  there  is  something  perverse  about  Honest 
Consciousness.   Hegel  is  not  trying  to  suggest  that  its  behavior  is  anything  but  the  perfectly 
normal  behavior  of  consciousness  in  general.   If  consciousness  confronts  any  sort  of  truth,  work, 
fact,  or  object  that  is  other,  it  has  a  drive  to  deny  its  otherness  and  claim  it  as  its  own.   We  can 
 nd  consciousness  doing  this  throughout  the  Phenomenology.    The  master  claims  the  slave  as 
his  own;  idealism  claims  reality  as  its  own;  consciousness  even  claims  to  have  constructed  God. 
Hegel's  point  here,  I  believe,  is  that  it  is  a  mistake  to  think  that  consciousness  can  or  should  be 
concerned  only  with  objectivity,  truth,  the  fact  itself.   Consciousness,  just  as  much,  and  rightfully 
so,  is  concerned  with  its  own  doing,  its  involvement,  its  expression,  its  construction,  its  interest. 
As  early  as  the  "Positivity  of  the  Christian  Religion,"  Hegel  says  that  we  take  an  interest  in  a 
thing  only  if  we  can  be  active  in  its  behalf.     Kantian  practical  reason  neglects  this  important 
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and  real  side  of  consciousness.   Practical  reason,  for  Kant,  cannot  legitimately  relate  to  the  moral 
law  out  of  interest.   Practical  reason  must  attend  to  the  fact  itself—the  moral  law  as  an  abstract 
105    Positivity  of  the  Christian  Religion,   164  and  GW,   I,  376. 
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universal.   Kantian  practical  reason  is  unable  to  give  interest  and  the  desire  for  recognition  a 
signi cant  place.   We  cannot  act  morally  without  subordinating  our  interest;  we  cannot  act 
morally  from   interest.   Kantian  morality  is  unable  to  satisfy  this  other  legitimate  side  of 
consciousness.   Hegel's  point  is  that  Sittlichkeit   will  be  able  to  do  so.  
And  so  what  we  have  as  long  as  we  remain  at  the  level  of  individual  consciousness  is  chaos. 
Each  individual  both  wants  credit  for  their  construction,  discovery,  or  work,  yet  pretends  to  be 
concerned  only  with  the  fact  itself  and  not  their  own  doing,  until  others,  as  they  naturally  will, 
begin  to  point  out  their  role  in  the  work  or  try  to  take  a  role  by  assisting,  at  which  point  the  fact 
itself  becomes  much  less  important  than  the  fact  that  it  is  your  own   work. 
Well,  what  if  Honest  Consciousness  decides  that  it  does  not  care  about  the  fact  itself;  what  if 
it  claims  that  the  only  thing  that  interests  it  is  its  own  action,  its  own  contribution,  its  own 
work—and  nothing  else?   Well,  this  will  not  succeed  either.   Our  own  expression,  e ort,  or  work 
simply  becomes  meaningless,  becomes  nothing,  unless  the  fact  itself  is  of  some  signi cance—of 
some  public   signi cance.   If  your  work  is  incapable  of  gaining  any  recognition,  then  it  will  do 
no  good  for  Honest  Consciousness  to  insist  that  all  it  cares  about  is  its  own  work.   If  this  work,  if 
the  fact  itself,  is  insigni cant  and  meaningless,  then  Honest  Consciousness  has  done  no  real 
work.   Both  sides—your  own   work  and  the  public   signi cance  of  the  fact  itself—are  essential.
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106    This  is  not  to  say  that  signi cant  work  never  goes  unrecognized.   A  work  that  is  signi cant 
and  deserving  of  recognition  can  fail  to  gain  that  recognition.   But  from  this  we  cannot  conclude  that 
public  recognition  should  be  dismissed  altogether  and  that  all  an  Honest  Consciousness  need  be 
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We  cannot,  then,  explain  action  simply  by  intention.   To  retreat  too  far  into  the  inner  life  is 
not  only  to  try  to  elude  responsibility  for  consequences,  as  Pippin  puts  it,    but  it  is  also  to  strip 
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action  of  any  meaning.   Kenneth  Westphal  makes  a  point  that  is  worth  noting  in  this  context. 
Practical  reason  is  inseparable  from  social  practice.   It  is  true  that  actions  are  carried  out  by 
individuals,  but  such  actions  are  possible  and  only  have  meaning  in  so  far  as  they  participate  in 
sociocultural  practices.   There  are  two  important  questions  here,  Westphal  suggests:   (1)  are 
individuals  the  only  bearers  of  psychological  states,  and  (2)  can  psychological  states  be 
understood  in  individual  terms?   Individualists  answer  both  questions  in  the  a rmative,  and  most 
holists  answer  both  questions  in  the  negative.   Hegel,  however,  answers  the   rst  question 
a rmatively  and  the  second  negatively.     In  other  words,  it  is  only  individuals  who  act,  have 
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intentions,  construct  facts,  and  so  forth.   Nevertheless,  such  acts,  intentions,  and  facts  cannot  be 
understood  apart  from  sociocultural  practices—their  meaning  can  only  be  understood  as 
interpreted  in  a  sociocultural  context.   
If  that  is  the  case,  then  as  soon  as  we  turn  to  the  self  and  attempt  to  understand  the  individual 
subject,  we  will   nd  that  it  too  cannot  be  understood  apart  from  sociocultural  practices.   It  too 
can  only  be  understood  as  interpreted  within  a  sociocultural  context.   While  we  do  have 
individual  subjects,  for  Hegel,  we  will   nd  that  we  will  not  be  able  to  hold  on  to  the  notion  of  a 
concerned  with  is  its  own  work.   Its  work  amounts  to  nothing  unless  it  deserves  recognition. 
Recognition  is  essential  here.   
107    Pippin,  206-7. 
108    K.R.  Westphal,  Hegel's  Epistemological  Realism:   A  Study  of  the  Aim  and  Method  of 
Hegel's  Phenomenology  of  Spirit   (Dordrecht:   Kluwer,  1989),  176.   
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subject  that  is  radically  distinct  from  other  subjects,  that  can  stand  above  or  outside  the  world, 
that  thus  could  be  the  source  of  a  virtue  that  could  guide  the  way  of  the  world,  that  could  be  a 
supreme  legislator,  or  that  could  be  committed  purely  to  the  fact  itself.   In  short,  we  do  not  have  a 
Kantian  subject,  a  subject  that  could  alone  be  the  source  of  a  categorical  imperative.   Instead,  we 
will  have  to  develop  a  di erent  conception  of  a  subject—one  embedded  in  a  context  of  cultural 
practices,  meanings,  objecti cations,  and  recognition. 
 
VI   
In  the   nal  two  sections  of  Chapter  V,  "Reason  as  Lawgiver"  and  "Reason  as  Testing  Laws,"  we 
take  up  an  analysis  of  Kant's  categorical  imperative  that  is  direct  and  explicit  enough  to  be  clear 
to  all  readers.   Here  we  have  a  Kantian  consciousness,  a  supreme  lawgiver,  that  takes  itself  to  be 
absolute,  universal,  and  authoritative.     It  would  claim  to  be  the  true  and  absolute  ethical 
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authority,  but  Hegel  will  try  to  show  us  that  it  is  not,  that  this  is  only  possible  if  we  move  to 
Sittlichkeit,   and  that  all  that  Kant  can  give  us  is  the  same  old  Honest  Consciousness  who  really 
tries  but  always  fails.  
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At  any  rate,  for  Kant,  practical  reason  claims  to  know  immediately  what  is  right  and  good 
and  to  be  able  to  issue  determinate  laws  accordingly.   As  Kant  puts  it  in  the  Metaphysical 
Principles  of  Virtue, 
 
109    PhS,   252-53  and  GW,   IX,  228-29. 
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An  imperative  is  a  practical  rule  by  which  an  action,  in  itself  contingent,  is  made 
necessary.…  a  rule  whose  representation  makes  a  subjectively  contingent  action  necessary 
and  therefore  represents  the  subject  as  one  who  must  be  constrained  (necessitated)  to 
conform  to  this  rule.   The  categorical  (unconditional)  imperative  is  one  that  does  not 
command  mediately  …  but  immediately,  through  the  mere  representation  of  this  action 
itself  (its  form),  which  is  thought  through  the  categorical  imperative  as  objectively 
necessary  …   
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Let  us  see  if  Kantian  practical  reason  can,  as  it  claims,  give  us  laws  that  make  subjectively 
contingent  actions  objective,  immediate,  unconditional,  and  necessary.   Let  us  take  an  example  of 
such  a  law:   "'Everyone  ought  to  speak  the  truth.'"     Well,  as  Hegel  points  out,  the  condition 
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will  at  once  have  to  be  admitted:   if   you  know  the  truth.   The  law,  then,  would  have  to  be  stated: 
everyone  ought  to  speak  the  truth  in  so  far  as  they  know  it.   But, 
 
with  this  admission,  it  in  fact  admits  that  already,  in  the  very  act  of  saying  the 
commandment,  it  really  violates  it.   It  said:    everyone  ought  to  speak  the  truth;  but  it 
meant:    he  ought  to  speak  it  according  to  his  knowledge  and  conviction;  that  is  to  say,  what 
it  said  was  di erent  from  what  it  meant;  and  to  speak  otherwise  than  one  means,  means  not 
speaking  the  truth.   The  untruth  or  inapt  expression  in  its  improved  form  now  runs: 
everyone  ought  to  speak  the  truth  according  to  his  knowledge  and  conviction  at  the  time. 
111    MPV,   21-22  and  KGS,   VI,  222. 
112    PhS,   254  and  GW,   IX,  229. 
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But  with  this  correction,  what  the  proposition  wanted  to  enunciate  as  universally  necessary 
and  intrinsically  valid,  has  really  turned  round  into  something  completely  contingent.   For 
speaking  the  truth  is  made  contingent  on  whether  I  can  know  it,  and  can  convince  myself  of 
it;  and  the  proposition  says  nothing  more  than  that  a  confused  muddle  of  truth  and 
falsehood  ought  to  be  spoken  just  as  anyone  happens  to  know,  mean,  and  understand  it.  
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We  do  not  have  anything  unconditional,  necessary,  or  objective  here,  but  merely  good  old 
Honest  Consciousness  still  trying  its  subjective  best.   We  might  further  change  the  proposition  by 
adding  that  the  truth  ought   to  be  known,  but  then  we  would  contradict  our  original  assumption 
that  practical  reason  knows  the  truth  immediately.   We  would  be  admitting  that  it  does  not 
actually  know  what  is  true—it  merely  ought  to  know  it.   This  is  not  unconditional  and  objective 
morality;  it  is  merely  subjective  and  intended.   
Take  the  commandment:   "'Love  thy  neighbor  as  thyself.'"     Such  love  would  at  least 
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require,  Hegel  suggests,  that  we  work  to  remove  evil  and  do  good  for  our  neighbor.   And  that 
would  mean  that  to  love  my  neighbor  intelligently  I  would  have  to  know   what  is  good  and  bad. 
Unintelligent  love  might  well  do  my  neighbor  harm.   We  are  slipping  toward  the  subjectivity  of 
Honest  Consciousness  again.   At  any  rate,  Hegel  argues  that  the  agency  most  capable  of  avoiding 
evil  and  accomplishing  intelligent  good  for  my  neighbor  would  be  the  just  state,  in  comparison  to 
which  what  any  single  individual  is  likely  to  accomplish  is  minimal.   Furthermore,  the  action  of 
113    PhS,   254  (italics  in  text)  and  GW,   IX,  230.   Also,  MPV,   90-92  and  KGS,   VI,  429-30. 
114    PhS,   255  and  GW,   IX,  230.   MPV,   60-61,  113-23,  149  and  KGS,   VI,  401-2,  448-58, 
480-81. 
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the  state  is  so  pervasive  that  if  I  as  an  individual  in  trying  to  bene t  my  neighbor  were  to  oppose 
the  state  in  a  way  that  was  either  intended  to  be  criminal  or  (like  the  friends  of  Honest 
Consciousness)  was  simply  an  attempt  to  cheat  the  state  of  its  due  credit  in  order  to  claim  it  for 
myself,  such  action  would  most  likely  be  frustrated  and  rendered  useless.   While  there  is  room 
for  individual  bene cence  in  single,  isolated,  contingent  situations,  generally  speaking,  the 
socio-cultural-political  world  is  such  a  pervasive  power  that  doing  good  of  the  sort  that  Kant 
envisions,  that  is,  the  doing  good  of  an  autonomous  individual  consciousness,  certainly  cannot 
realistically  be  demanded  necessarily  and  unconditionally.   Such  action  is  too  easily  swept  aside 
or  rendered  meaningless.   Whether  the  act  will  be  a  work  that  bene ts  the  neighbor  as  intended, 
or  be  immediately  undone,  or  twisted  and  perverted  by  circumstance  into  harm,  is  a  matter  of 
chance—certainly  when  we  are  dealing  with  the  way  of  the  world,  this  race  of  devils  that  only 
appears  as  a  nation  of  angels.   It  cannot  meaningfully  be  demanded  necessarily  and 
unconditionally  that  we  act  for  the  good  of  others  if  it  will  always  be  contingent  whether  any  act, 
depending  upon  whether  it  accords  with  the  state  or  not,  will  be  erased  or  reinforced,  distorted  or 
maintained,  turned  into  its  opposite  or  left  as  it  is.   It  is  as  likely  to  be  possible  as  not.   We  have 
not  moved  very  far  beyond  fate  to  rationally  ordered  providence—we  have  chance  here,  not 
universality  and  necessity.   If  one  objects  that  Kantian  morality  should  not  be  motivated  by 
concern  for  such  consequences  or  contexts,  the  answer  must  be  that  it  cannot  then  do  good  to  its 
neighbor  in  any  morally  signi cant  way.   In  the  Foundations,   Kant  argues  that:  
 
An  action  performed  from  duty  does  not  have  its  moral  worth  in  the  purpose  which  is  to  be 
achieved  through  it  but  in  the  maxim  by  which  it  is  determined.   Its  moral  value,  therefore, 
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does  not  depend  on  the  realization  of  the  object  of  the  action  but  merely  on  the  principle  of 
volition  by  which  the  action  is  done,  without  any  regard  to  the  objects  of  the  faculty  of 
desire.…  Wherein,  then,  can  this  worth  lie  if  it  is  not  in  the  will  in  relation  to  its  hoped-for 
e ect?   It  can  lie  nowhere  else  than  in  the  principle  of  the  will,  irrespective  of  the  ends 
which  can  be  realized  by  such  action.  
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We  are  back  to  good  old  Honest  Consciousness  who  has  at  least  tried,  or,  as  Hegel  puts  it, 
“[i]f  this  consciousness  does  not  convert  its  purpose  into  a  reality,  it  has  at  least  willed   it,  i.e.  it 
makes  the  purpose  qua   purpose,  the  mere  doing  which  does  nothing  …  and  can  therefore 
explain  and  console  itself  with  the  fact  that  all  the  same  something  was  taken  in  hand  and  done.”
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We  do  not  have  a  consciousness  capable  of  giving  us  an  objective,  unconditional,  immediate, 
and  necessary  law  here.   Its  law   “does  not  express,  as  an  absolute  ethical  law  should,  something 
that  is  valid  in  and  for  itself”;  its  laws  “stop  at  Ought,  they  have  no  actuality  …  “     Kantian 
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practical  reason  does  not  give  us  laws;  it  merely  issues  commandments. 
What  does  it  mean  to  say  that  we  do  not  have  a  law,  but  merely  a  commandment?   In  the 
Foundations,   Kant  claims  that  we  can  derive  the  fourth  formulation  of  the  categorical 
imperative,  namely,  a  kingdom  of  ends,  from  the  fact  that  we  must  consider  each  individual  to  be 
a  supreme  lawgiver.   A  kingdom  of  ends  is  a  union  of  rational  beings  in  a  system  of  common 
115    F,   16  and  KGS,   IV,  399-400.   Also,  MPV,   119  and  KGS,   VI,  455. 
116    PhS,   247  (italics  in  text)  and  GW,   IX,  224. 
117    PhS,   256  and  GW,   IX,  231. 
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laws.     In  other  words,  Kant  is  claiming  that  individual  practical  reason  gives  us  all  we  need 
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from  which  to  derive  the  state  and  its  laws.   From  supreme  lawgivers,  each  obeying  only  laws 
they  give  themselves,  we  can  derive  the  system  of  laws  that  make  up  the  state.   Hegel  denies  that 
individual  consciousness  can  give  us  the  sorts  of  laws  we  have  or  need  in  a  state. 
The  sorts  of  laws  that  Hegel  thinks  we  need  are  not  grounded  in  the  will  of  particular 
individuals.   Laws  must  have  their  own  intrinsic  being—they  must  exist  in  and  for  themselves. 
This  is  not  to  say  that  laws  are  not  constructed.   Even  God  is  constructed  for  Hegel.   And  the  fact 
that  laws  are  constructed  by  citizens  will  be  essential  if  we  are  to  be  free.   But  the  law  is  not 
constructed  by  individual   consciousness.   It  does  not  have  its  source  in  individual  Kantian 
practical  reason.   It  is  the  work  of  all,  of  a  community,  a  culture,  a  nation.   Laws  are  rooted  in  and 
grow  out  of  the  customs,  traditions,  and  practices  of  a  people  and  are  tied  to  their  social  and 
public  institutions,  their  public  values,  their  philosophy,  religion,  and  art.   Such  laws  are  not 
subjective  and  contingent;  they  are  objective,  unconditional,  and  necessary—they  are  true  and 
absolute. 
Let  us  see  if  we  can  understand  and  make  at  least  a  reasonably  plausible  case  for  the  sorts  of 
laws  that  Hegel  is  after.   Consider  the  example  of  a  state  and  its  educational  system.   In  Hegel 
view,  the  state  would  expect  that  its  professors  teach  the  truth.   We  need  not  conclude  that  this 
will  threaten  academic  freedom.   Even  if  the  state  were  a  paradigm  of  respect  for  academic 
freedom,  it  would  still  assume,  at  least,  that  its  professors  did  not  knowingly  and  systematically 
teach  falsehood.   Even  further,  Hegel  would  hold,  it  will  also  expect  these  professors  to  know   the 
truth,  at  the  very  least,  in  the  sense  that  it  would  be  fraudulent  for  the  university  to  hire  professors 
118    F,   50-51  and  KGS,   IV,  432-33. 
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who  have  not  undergone  the  proper  training  and  engaged  in  serious  study,  whose  only  credentials 
were  that  they  were  enthusiastic  about  their  opinions  and  sincere  in  their  intentions.   So  when  the 
university  hires  professors  of  engineering  or  art  it  does  not  merely  expect  them  like  Honest 
Consciousness  to  try  their  best.   It  expects  them  to  actually  be  able  to  build  real  bridges  and  paint 
real  paintings  and  to  teach  others  how  to  do  so.   We  hold  professors  responsible  for  actually 
doing  these  things,  not  just  for  trying.   So  also  we  expect  the  university  to  give  its  students  an 
education  that  will  (assuming  a  just  society)   t  them  for  life  in  the  state,  prepare  them  for  a 
vocation,  and  give  them  the  moral  and  scienti c  knowledge  needed  for  these  purposes.   We 
expect  this  at  least  in  the  sense  that  were  the  university  systematically  to  fail  to  do  so  we  would 
conclude  that  it  was  not  functioning  properly.   The  law  has  a  right  to  require  more  than  that  the 
university  try.   It  is  expected  to  succeed.  
What  we  need  and  have  in  culture,  Hegel  thinks,  is  far  richer  and  more  powerful  than  mere 
subjective  Kantian  oughts.   Sittlichkeit   does  not  merely  tell  us  that  we  ought  to  educate  our 
children  or  do  good  to  our  neighbors,  it  gives  us  an  understanding  of  what  things  like  good  to  our 
neighbor  and  proper  education  actually  are  and  it  embeds  them  in  our  customs,  traditions, 
practices,  and  institutions  so  that  we  are  able  to  act  in  the  world  and  actually  do  act  accordingly. 
It  enables  us  not  just  to  try  or  to  will,  but  to  succeed,  and  to  pass  this  knowledge  and  ability  on  to 
others.   It  gives  us  much  more  than  an  ought—it  gives  us  actuality. 
What  we  must  see  is  that  Sittlichkeit   is  missing  in  Kant’s  thought  and  that  we  need  it  to 
account  for  our  experience.   A  true  law  must  grow  up  and  be  rooted  in  a  community,  in  its 
customs,  traditions,  and  practices.   It  must  be  a  force  that  morally  empowers  its  citizens.   It  is  not 
enough  (which  is  to  say,  for  Hegel,  it  is  not  ethically   enough)  that  it  merely  oblige  them  morally, 
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that  it  be  a  mere  maxim  that  can  be  universalized,  that  it  merely  be  willed.   But  that  is   enough  to 
establish  its  “moral  value”  for  Kant,  as  he  himself  says.     And  so  Kantian  reason  is  not  a 
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lawgiver.   At  best  it  is  a  test  of  laws. 
 
VII   
But  even  as  a  test  of  laws,  Kant's  ethics  fail.   In  taking  up  a  given  content  in  order  to  test  it,  to  see 
if  it  is  universalizable,  we   nd,  at  least  in  some  important  cases,  that  one  content  will  work  as 
well  as  its  opposite.   If  you  ask,  for  example,  whether  there  should  be  private  property,  you  will 
 nd  private  property  to  be  perfectly  self-consistent—you  can  universalize  it  without 
contradiction.   But  you  can  just  as  well  universalize  the  absence  of  private  property—a 
community  of  goods  or  communism.   That  involves  no  contradiction  either.  
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Singer,  in  his  by  now  classic  criticism,  claims  that  Hegel  is  “almost  incredibly 
simple-minded”  here.   It  seems  to  me,  however,  that  Singer  misses  Hegel’s  point  entirely. 
According  to  Singer,  Hegel  should  be  able  to  see  that,  
 
if  everyone  stole,  whenever  and  whatever  he  pleased,  there  would  be  no  such  thing  as 
property  and  hence  the  purpose  of  stealing  would  be  made  impossible.…  Yet  [Hegel]  seems 
utterly  confused  as  to  why  it  would  therefore  be  wrong  to  steal.…  Kant’s  point  …  is  a 
relatively  simple  one,  which  is  perhaps  why  the  profundities  of  Hegel  are  so  far  from  the 
mark.   It  could  not  be  willed  to  be  a  universal  law  that  everyone  could  steal  whenever  he 
119    F,   16  and  KGS,   IV,  399. 
120    PhS,   257-58  and  GW,   IX,  233-34.   PR,   89-90  and  SW,   VII,  193-94. 
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wished  to,  for  if  everyone  stole  whenever  he  wished  to,  or  took  for  his  own  anything  he 
happened  to  want,  there  would  be  no  property  and  hence  nothing  to  steal—there  would  be 
nothing  he  could  call  his  own.   Stealing  presupposes  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as 
property—something  to  be  stolen  …   
121
  
Singer  so  little  understands  Hegel’s  criticism  of  Kant  that  the  last  line  of  this  passage, 
intended  to  undermine  Hegel,  in  fact  concedes  Hegel’s  point  against  Kant.   Hegel  thinks  that  in 
formulating  a  maxim  the  Kantian  presupposes   a  certain  form  of  property  as  given  and  that  only 
with  this  presupposition  will  the  principle  of  universalization  work.   Unless  we  know  what  sort 
of  property  is  right  in  a  given  culture—and  universalization  alone  will  not  tell  us—we  cannot 
know  what  would  constitute  an  act  of  theft  and  what  would  not.   For  example,  suppose  I  enter  a 
store,  pocket  an  article  of  consumption  without  putting  down  any  money,  and  walk  o .   Was  that 
theft  or  not?   Was  it  immoral  or  not?   Asking  whether  the  maxim  can  be  universalized  will  not 
tell  me.   If  I  live  in  a  market  economy  with  private  property,  the  act  was  theft.   If  I  live  in  a 
communist  society  based  upon  the  principle  "to  each  according  to  their  need,"  it  was  not  theft. 
Both  private  property  and  communism  are  equally  universalizable.   Universalizability  will  not 
decide  the  issue.   We  must  have  a  cultural  world  with  cultural  content  given  to  us.   Either  private 
property  or  communism  must  be  given  as  right  before  we  can  go  on  to  decide  what  constitutes  an 
act  of  theft.   We  need  Sittlichkeit,   that  is,  settled  and  given  customs,  traditions,  and 
practices—we  need  culture—for  morality  to  be  possible. 
121    M.G.  Singer,  Generalization  in  Ethics   (New  York:   Knopf,  1961),  251-52. 
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Singer  basically  has  Hegel’s  argument  backwards.   He  makes  the  common  but  mistaken 
claim  that  in  Hegel’s  view  the  categorical  imperative  is  empty  and  contentless,  "Hegel  assumes 
that  the  categorical  imperative  is  supposed  to  be  applied  in  a  vacuum  …  that  Kant’s  ethics  is  an 
'empty  formalism.'"   Hegel,  in  Singer’s  view,  does  not  see  that  if  "someone  proposes  to  adopt  a 
certain  maxim,  or  to  act  in  a  certain  way  in  certain  circumstances  in  order  to  achieve  a  certain 
purpose,  then  we  …  'already  possess  a  content,'  to  which  the  categorical  imperative  can  be 
applied."     This  is  not  what  Hegel  is  saying.   Hegel  is  not  denying  that  the  categorical 
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imperative  has  a  content  in  Singer’s  sense;  Hegel  fully  accepts  that  in  formulating  a  maxim  we 
take  up  a  content.   He  says  explicitly  in  the  Phenomenology   that  what  we  have  is  a  “standard  for 
deciding  whether  a  content  is  capable  of  being  a  law  or  not,”  and  he  goes  on  to  talk  about  content 
at  least  three  times  in  the  next  page.     Moreover,  Hegel  well  knows  that  adopting  a  maxim 
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commits  the  person  to  an  act  or  an  end.   After  all,  as  we  have  seen,  one  of  Hegel’s  criticisms  of 
the  categorical  imperative  is  that  it  gives  us  an  ought—  for  Hegel  it  is  a  mere   ought  rather  than 
an  is—  but  nevertheless  it  does   give  us  an  ought  (it  gives  us  a  commandment,  though  not  a  law). 
The  problem  here  stems,  I  think,  from  misinterpreting  the  following  passage  from  Hegel’s 
Philosophy  of  Right, 
 
122   Singer,  252.   K.  Westphal,  ”The  basic  context  and  structure  of  Hegel’s  Philosophy  of  Right,” 
in  The  Cambridge  Companion  to  Hegel,   ed.  F.C.  Beiser  (Cambridge:   Cambridge  University  Press, 
1993),  252-53. 
123    PhS,   256  and  GW,   IX,  232.   In  PR,   90  and  SW,   VII,  194,  Hegel  speaks  of  bringing  a 
particular  content  for  acting  under  consideration. 
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The  Proposition:   ‘Act  as  if  the  maxim  of  thine  action  could  be  laid  down  as  a  universal 
principle’,  would  be  admirable  if  we  already  had  determinate  principles  of  conduct.   That  is 
to  say,  to  demand  of  a  principle  that  it  shall  be  able  to  serve  in  addition  as  a  determinant  of 
universal  legislation  is  to  presuppose  that  it  already  possesses  a  content.   Given  the  content, 
then  of  course  the  application  of  the  principle  would  be  a  simple  matter.  
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Singer  takes  the  implication  of  this  passage  to  be  that  we  do  not   have  a  content,  that  the 
categorical  imperative  is  contentless.   But  that  is  not  the  point  the  passage  is  making  at  all.   The 
point  is  that  for  the  categorical  imperative  to  work  we  must  be  given  a  content—in  the  sense  of  a 
determinant  principle  of  conduct.   In  other  words,  our  culture  has  to  tell  us,  for  example,  that 
private  property  is  right .    Once  we  have  this,  Hegel  is  saying,  then  the  categorical  imperative 
will  have  no  di culty  in  telling  us  that  walking  o   with  the  article  from  the  store  was  theft. 
Hegel  is  not  claiming  that  the  categorical  imperative  has  no  content.   He  is  claiming  that  it  will 
not  work  without  content.   Where  does  the  content  come  from?   It  is  certainly  not  generated  out 
of  the  categorical  imperative  itself.   It  is  taken  up  from  culture—it  is  given  by  culture  as  right. 
Private  property  must  be  given  as  right  before  we  can  see  that  what  we  did  in  the  store  was  theft. 
Hegel  makes  this  point  very  clearly  in  the  Philosophy  of  Right, 
 
The  absence  of  property  contains  in  itself  just  as  little  contradiction  as  the  non-existence 
of  this  or  that  nation,  family,  &c.,  or  the  death  of  the  whole  human  race.   But  if  it  is  already 
established  on  other  grounds  and  presupposed  that  property  and  human  life  are  to  exist  and 
124    PR,   254  and  SW,   VII,  195. 
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be  respected,  then  indeed  it  is  a  contradiction  to  commit  theft  or  murder;  a  contradiction 
must  be  a  contradiction  of  something,  i.e.  of  some  content  presupposed  from  the  start  as  a 
 xed  principle.  
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The  argument  against  Kant,  then,  is  not  that  the  categorical  imperative  is  contentless.   The 
argument  is  that  the  categorical  imperative  presupposes   it  content;  it  takes  up  its  content 
uncritically.  The  Kantian  formulating  a  maxim  concerning  theft  assumes  that  private  property  is 
given.   As  Hegel  puts  it  in  the  Phenomenology,   “Laws  are  …  tested;   and  for  the  consciousness 
which  tests  them  they  are  already   given.   It  takes  up  their  content   simply  as  it  is,  without 
concerning  itself  …  with  the  particularity  and  contingency  inherent  in  its  reality  …  its  attitude 
towards  it  is  just  as  uncomplicated  as  is  its  being  a  criterion  for  testing  it.”  
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Perhaps  this  point  is  made  most  clearly  in  the  Natural  Law   essay,  though  Hegel  overstates 
his  point  in  this  early  essay.   He  says,  
 
[i]f  this  formalism  is  to  be  able  to  promulgate  a  law,  some  matter,  something  speci c,  must 
be  posited  to  constitute  the  content  of  the  law.   And  the  form  given  to  this  speci c  matter  is 
unity  or  universality.   “That  a  maxim  of  thy  will  shall  count  at  the  same  time  as  a  principle 
of  universal  legislation”—this  basic  law  of  pure  practical  reason  expresses  the  fact  that 
125    PR,   90  and  SW,   VII,  194. 
126    PhS,   257  (italics  in  text)  and  GW,   IX,  232-33.     Hoy  makes  an  argument  similar  to  mine; 
see  D.C.  Hoy,  “Hegel’s  Critique  of  Kantian  Morality,”  History  of  Philosophy  Quarterly,   6  (1989), 
216   . 
 
Hegel’s  Critique  of  Kantian  Practical  Reason 
something  speci c,  constituting  the  content  of  the  maxim  of  the  particular  will,  shall  be 
posited  as  concept,  as  universal.   But  every  speci c  matter  is  capable  of  being  clothed  with 
the  form  of  the  concept  …  there  is  nothing  whatever  which  cannot  in  this  way  be  made  into 
a  moral  law.    
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While  Hegel  is  overstating  his  case  in  holding  that  anything   can  be  made  into  a  moral  law, 
nevertheless,  his  basic  point  is  that  di erent  cultures  can  and  have  established  very  di erent 
things  as  moral  laws—very  di erent  forms  of  property,  for  example.   And  it  is  obvious  that  quite 
consistent  social  organizations  can  be  built  around  such  di erent  laws.   The  principle  of 
universalization  is  not  going  to  show  us  that  all  but  one  of  these  forms  of  property  and  social 
organization  are  contradictory;  there  will  at  least  be  many  di erent  forms  of  property  and  social 
organization  that  it  will  not  show  to  be  contradictory.   The  categorical  imperative,  then,  will  not 
tell  us  which  of  these  forms  of  property  is  right.   Only  after  we  are  given  one  of  these  forms  of 
property  as  right  can  the  categorical  imperative  begin  to  tell  us  what  would  be  an  act  of  theft  and 
what  would  not.   
Hegel  is  not  out  to  junk  the  categorical  imperative.   He  is  simply  claiming  that  a  certain 
content  must  be  given  for  it  to  work,  a  content  which  in  his  view  Kant  naively  presupposes.   This 
content  is  given  by  culture  and  thus  morality  needs  a  theory  of  culture.   Hegel  is  trying  to  drive 
us  toward  Sittlichkeit.    Furthermore,  Hegel  is  not  out  to  junk  universalizability.   In  Hegel’s  view, 
universalizability  is  necessary  for  morality;  it  is  just  that  it  does  not  amount   to  morality.   Acting 
127   Natural  Law,   trans.  T.M.  Knox  (Philadelphia:   University  of  Pennsylvania  Press,  1975), 
76-77  and,  for  the  German,  GW,   IV,  436. 
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on  a  categorical  imperative—in  so  far  as  that  means  acting  merely  on  what  reason  tells  us  is 
universalizable—is  not  enough  to  be  moral.   As  Hegel  puts  it,  something  is  not  right  because  it  is 
non-contradictory;  "it  is  right  because  it  is  what  is  right."  
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Let  us  see  if  we  can  even  better  explain  the  sort  of  moral  law  that  Hegel  is  after.   For  Hegel, 
we  can  fail  in  two  ways.   If  we  have  a  real  law,  the  sort  that  Hegel  wants,  an  absolute,  not  a  mere 
commandment  or  an  ought,  then  this  law  cannot  be  issued  by  a  single  person  or  an  individual 
consciousness.   That  would  turn  the  law  into  something  tyrannical  and  it  would  turn  obedience  to 
such  a  law  into  something  slavish.   On  the  other  hand,  while  Kantian  testing  of  laws  certainly 
gives  us  freedom  from  such  laws,  which  are  rejected  as  alien  and  heteronomous,  nevertheless  it 
leaves  us  with  individual  consciousness  and  the  loss  of  an  absolute  grounding.     Hegel  wants  to 
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avoid  both  of  these  extremes.   
What  Hegel  wants  in  a  law  is  that  it  be  valid  in  and  for  itself.   It  must  not  be  grounded  in  the 
will  of  particular  individuals.   In  obeying  such  laws,  self-consciousness  must  not  in  any  way  be 
subordinating  itself  to  a  master  whose  commands  are  alien  and  arbitrary.   Self-consciousness 
must   nd  these  laws  to  be  "the  thoughts  of  its  own  absolute  consciousness,  thoughts  which  are 
immediately  its  own. "     We  construct  these  laws;  we  issue  them;  but  as  participating  in  a 
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cultural  consciousness,  the  consciousness  of  a  people  or  nation,  not  as  individual 
consciousnesses.   These  laws  are  not  arbitrary,  tyrannical,  or  alien.   They  are  not  heteronomous. 
128    PhS,   262  and  GW,   IX,  236. 
129    PhS,   260  and  GW,   IX,  234-35. 
130    PhS,   261  (italics  in  text)  and  GW,   IX,  235. 
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They  are  my  own   laws.   I  am  free  in  obeying  them.   But  I  also  recognize  them  as  universal, 
objective,  absolute,  the  will  of  all,  the  will  of  my  people. 
Self-consciousness  does  not  even  believe   in  its  laws.   Belief  in  something  suggests  that  the 
believer  is  an  individual  consciousness  and  that  what  it  believes  in  is  alien  to  it.   For  Hegel  we 
should  be  immediately  one  with  our  laws.     It  is  not  enough  to  merely  believe  in  them.   Laws 
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must  be  so  rooted  in  the  customs  and  practices  of  my  culture  that  I  simply  know  them.   They  are 
facts.   They  are  true.   They  are  absolute.   Is  this  really  so  strange?   I  suggest  that  we  do  not 
merely  believe   that  murder,  for  example,  is  wrong.   We  certainly  do  not  need,  in  order  to   know 
that  it  is  wrong,  to  engage  in  a  subjective  process  of  analysis,  a  deduction,  like  asking  whether 
murder  can  be  universalized  without  contradiction.     To  suggest  that  we  must  is  to  miss 
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something  fundamental  about  morality.   It  is  to  subjectivize  something  that  is  absolute.   Hegel's 
concept  of  Sittlichkeit   wants  to  avoid  heteronomy  and  give  us  freedom,  but  without  losing  the 
absolute. 
We  must  move  to  culture,  where  ethical  content  has  an  objective  being  of  its  own,  where  it  is 
not  just  subjective  rationality  that  decides  what  is  moral  as  for  Kant.   Things  are  not  moral 
simply  because  my  rationality   nds  them  to  be  moral.   They  are  objectively  moral—moral 
in-themselves.   Yet  this  objective  moral  content  is  not  something  other,  alien  to  consciousness, 
heteronomous,  as  Kant  would  think.   It  is  the  construction  of  consciousness.   Think  of  the 
131    Ibid. 
132    Of  course,  to  decide  whether  a  particular  act  is  an  act  of  murder  or  whether  it  is   rst  or 
second  degree  murder  might  require  a  great  deal  of  analysis  and  deduction.   That  murder  itself  is 
wrong,  however,  does  not  and  should  not. 
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Athenian  assembly  creating  its  own  laws—laws  which  grow  out  of  and  are  reinforced  by  custom 
and  tradition,  the  myths  and  the  gods,  and  thus  are  objective,  absolute,  ethical  in-themselves  for 
the  people  they  form.   Only  Sittlichkeit   is  capable  of  bringing  all  of  the  elements  of  the  ethical 
together:   (1)  subjective  passion,  interest,  engagement,  involvement;  (2)  all  located  in  a  cultural 
context  in  which  we  are  at  home,  which  we   nd  to  be  our  own,   all  constructed  by  the  citizens 
themselves,  where  we  are  thus  free;  which  (3)  at  the  same  time  grows  out  of  and  is  reinforced  by 
custom  and  tradition,  public  institutions,  art,  religion,  and  philosophy,  the  objective  and  absolute 
values,  ends,  and  purposes  of  a  nation;  and  (4)  within  this  context  the  citizens  re ect  rationally 
and  establish  universal  laws.   In  such  a  context,  citizens  know  and  accomplish—they  live  in  and 
are  a  part  of—the  ethical.   Ethical  life  exists;  it  empowers  its  citizens;  it  pervades  and  is  actually 
played  out  in  their  lives  and  practices.   It  is  not  a  mere  ought. 
To  fully   justify  Hegel's  ethical  views  would  require  that  we  say  much  more  about  Sittlichkeit , 
but  that  is  a  task  for  another  paper.   Our  task  here  has  been  to  show  that  Hegel's  critique  of 
Kantian  ethics  is  much  more  powerful  and  thorough  than  has  been  recognized  by  those  who  fail 
to  see  that  Hegel  criticizes  Kant's  ethics  throughout  a  large  part  of  Chapter  V  of  the 
Phenomenology,   not  just  in  the  last  two  sections.   Defenders  of  Kant  often  want  to  claim  that 
Hegel  has  not  understood  Kant  or  that  Hegel  attacks  a  crudely  understood  Kant.   I  hope  I  have 
shown  that  Hegel  understands  Kant  in  a  rather  sophisticated  way,  thinks  Kant  is  wrong,  and  does 
a  reasonable  job  of  arguing  against  Kant.   Moreover,  it  seems  to  me  that  many  Kantians  can  be 
accused  of  misunderstanding  Hegel,  and  once  they  begin  to  understand  him,  they  will   nd 
arguments  against  Kant  that,  whether  they  can   nally  be  answered  or  not,  certainly  cannot 
simply  be  dismissed  as  mere  misunderstandings  of  Kant. 
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